The main legal point established in the judgment is that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima-facie case for injunction, and the balance of convenience and irreparable injury favored the defendant Society.

The plaintiffs have filed the present Suit for declaration that the letter of termination dated 14th July, 2009 issued by the defendant no.1 Society thereby terminating the Development Agreement i.e. agreement dated 27th February, 1986, agreement dated 10th July, 1995, Supplemental Agreement dated 7th January, 1998, Supplemental Developmental Agreement dated 5th September, 2006 and Power of Attorney dated 20th June, 1995 and 18th May, 2008 are illegal and bad in law. A further declaration is sought that the aforesaid agreements and the Power of Attorneys are valid, subsisting and binding on the parties. A decree for specific performance of the aforesaid Developmental Agreements has also been prayed for. The plaintiff has in the alternative prayed for a decree against the defendants for a sum of Rs. 324 Crores along with interest on Rs. 2.83 Crores at the rate of 15% p.a. from the date of the suit till payment/realisation. Along with the suit a notice of motion has been taken out by the plaintiffs praying for an order, restraining the defendants from acting upon the termination of the aforesaid agreements and/or creating any third party rights in respect of the suit property etc. The plaintiffs have also prayed for ad-interim reliefs in the aforesaid terms.

2. I have heard Shri Naphade, the learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs, Shri Samdani the learned Senior Counsel for the defendant no.1 and Shri Dhond, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of defendant no. 2 at length.

3. Shri Naphade, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs submits that the alleged termination of the developmental agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant no.1, by the defendant no.1 in its meeting dated 10th March, 2009 is on the ground that the terms and conditions in development agreement were “jaacak” which according to ordinary English translation would mean unconscionable. The learned Counsel submits that the perusal of none of the terms and conditions would show that they are either unconscionable or unjust. The learned Counsel submits that the agreements were required to be made from time to time in order to give effect to the statutory provisions made in the Development Control Regulations (referred to as “DCR”) and the provisions of the Maharashtra Slums Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the “Slum Act”). It is submitted that one of the terms and conditions in one of the agreements which provide that each person would be entitled only to an area admeasuring 225 sq. feet was on account of the statutory provisions, which provide that a person would not be entitled to more than 225 sq. feet carpet area. It is, therefore, submitted that by no stretch of imagination the said terms could be construed to be unconscionable. The learned Counsel submits that in any case the Supplemental Agreement which was entered into between the plaintiff and defendant no.1 was entered into after the approval of the General Body and as such the grievance in that regard is without any substance. The learned Counsel further submits that though the termination as could be found from the Resolution of the General Body of defendant no.1 dated 3rd March, 2009 is on the ground that terms and conditions were unconscionable, the entire case of defendant no.1 as could be seen from the affidavit-in-reply is that the termination is on the ground that the 70% of the members consent was not obtained by the plaintiffs, as is the statutory requirement. The learned Counsel further submits that the said question is no more res integra and submitted that Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 1301/1999 has in unequivocal terms held that, insofar as present Society is concerned, the consent of the 70% members is not necessary and as such same would operate as a res judicata between the parties. It is, therefore, submitted that it is not open to the defendant no.1 to say that