The main legal point established in the judgment is that a final judgment imposing a time limit for completion of trial is not subject to review or modification, and non-compliance with the time limit may result in the accused being acquitted.

1. This is a criminal application presented by the State of Maharashtra at the instance of Inspector of Police, C.B.I., A.C.B. CDW, Bombay. The respondent to this application is Mr. R. Mahadevan Iyer, who is the original accused in a set of prosecutions pending before the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 3rd Court, Esplanade, Bombay. These prosecutions are numbered as Criminal Cases Nos. 630/ P of 1979 to Criminal Case No. 636/ P of 1979 and Criminal Cases Nos. 9/P, 10/P and 11 /P of 1982.

2. The incidents giving rise to these prosecutions pertained to the year 1976-77. After the investigations were carried out, the charge-sheets were filed in the years 1979 and 1982 and the proceedings have been pending before the Court since that point of time. One of the cases has been filed before the Court of Session at Greater Bombay, which I shall deal with separately. It is alleged that the respondent-accused was doing business as a clearing agent and that he committed certain irregularities in connection with some documents, the total value of the same amounting to approximately Rs. 75,000/-. In view of the fact that there were 10 such parties involved, the investigating authorities were required to split up the prosecutions into 10 separate cases.

3. In the year 1988, an application was made to this Court for modification of the bank guarantee, at which time Sugla, J. passed his order dated 25-5-1988 observing that the proceedings were pending for a long time without any justification and the concerned Magistrate was directed to dispose of the pending criminal cases expeditiously but not later than two years from the date of receipt of the writ. It is relevant to point out that this order was passed on 25-5-1988. Once again in April 1991, the State of Maharashtra applied to Sugla, J. for extension of the bank guarantee that had by then expired. By his order dated 26-4-1991, Sugla, J. had very clearly observed as follow:-

"Having heard the counsel, I am of the view that the Metropolitan Magistrate was certainly not justified in not completing the trial within the stipulated time directed by this Court. The Public Prosecutor on behalf of the State submits that there were some difficulties. I am not impressed. However, having regard to the nature of the proceedings, I allow a further period of six months from the date of the receipt of the writ of this Court on the Cri. A. to the Metropolitan Magistrate to complete the trial. It is made clear to the Public Prosecutor who is present and to the Metropolitan Magistrate through the order that in case the trial is not completed within the period of six months as stated above, the respondent shall be acquitted honourably. As regards the fresh bank guarantee I am, satisfied that the laches are on the part of the Metropolitan Magistrate and in that sense the State Government cannot be absolved from its responsibility. It was for them to see that the trial is completed within the period of two years and in any event not to allow the bank guarantee to lapse. Having not done so in time, I do not think a case has been made out before this Court for directing the respondent to furnish a fresh bank guarantee. It may not be out of place to mention that the respondent, it is stated, is allowed to lorry on his business as clearing agent. In the circumstances, assuming he is found guilty on trial, I do not see in what way the case of the prosecution will be jeopardised. Order accordingly."

It is essential for me to record that this Court had, in unequivocal terms, observed that a final time-limit of six months had been granted to the prosecution for Completion of the proceedings. This Court had also laid down that if the proceedings are not completed within that period, the respondent-accused would stand acquitted. The mandate of the High Court's order was very clear in so far as this Court had taken the view that the long period of time that had elapsed was unjustified and t