The judgment of the Court was delivered by

MADON, J. - In each of these above five references under section 61(1) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, the following question has been submitted to this Court for its determination :

"Whether on a true and proper interpretation of section 41(2) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, read with the notifications issued thereunder, the Tribunal was justified in law in coming to the conclusion that a precise quantification of the tax is not possible thereunder and, therefore, that provision was unenforceable ?"

The facts which have given rise to these references are that the respondents are a registered dealer and have also been certified by the Commissioner of Sales Tax for the purposes of entry 39 to Notification No. STA. 1059-(iii)-G-1 dated 28th December, 1959, issued under section 41(1) of the said Act as registered dealers who manufacture cotton fabrics of the type mentioned in the said entry. The respondents, however, did not themselves manufacture in its ordinary sense, that is, did not make cloth themselves. The respondents' business consists of buying grey cloth in the market and then dyeing and printing it and thereafter selling it in the market. They also do job-work of dyeing and printing cloth made by others for sale. For the purpose of carrying out their above activity of dyeing and printing cloth the respondents purchased during the various assessment periods, to which these references relate, machinery as also its component parts and accessories and dyes and chemicals and in respect thereof paid tax at a lower rate as provided in the said entry 39 by giving to their vendors declarations in form T to the said entry in which they inter alia declared that the said purchased goods were required for use by them in the manufacture of cotton fabrics for sale.

In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax held that the sales of the machinery, its component parts and dyes and chemicals to the respondents were not taxable at the lower rate mentioned in the said entry 39 because the respondents' activity of dyeing and printing cloth did not constitute manufacture within the meaning of the said expression as used in the said entry 39. The Assistant Commissioner accordingly assessed the respondents under section 41(2) and (3) of the said Act to pay the balance of tax which would otherwise have been payable had the respondents not given declarations in form T. The Tribunal in deciding the matter held that the said section 41(2) was unenforceable. It did not consider the real question which arose for its decision in the second appeals from which the present references arise, namely, whether the respondents were manufacturers within the meaning of the said entry 39. Clause (17) of section 2 of the said Act defines the term "manufacture". The said definition is as follows :

"'Manufacture', with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means producing, making, extracting, altering, ornamenting, finishing or otherwise processing, treating, or adapting any goods; but does not include such manufactures or manufacturing processes as may be prescribed."

It is obvious that dyeing and printing would be a process carried out on cloth and would result in a new marketable commodity coming into existence (see Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Dunken Coffee Manufacturing Co. ([1975] 35 S.T.C 493.) and Hiralal Jitmal v. Commissioner of Sales Tax ([1957] 8 S.T.C. 325.). It is not disputed before us by Mr. Jetly, the learned counsel for the applicant, that dyeing and printing cloth would be manufacture within the meaning of clause (17) of section 2. What is, however, contended is that though dyeing and printing cloth may be manufacture within the meaning of the said clause (17), the artificial definition of the term "manufacture" given in that clause would not apply to the expression "manufactures" in the said entry 39.

In view of the provisions of se