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1949 Supreme(Bom) 16

HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
CHAGLA, WESTON, DIXIT, JJ.
Natvarlal Punjabhai
Versus
Dadubhai Manubhai
First Appeal No. 175 of 1946, from decision of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Broach, in Special Suit No. 9 of 1941.
Decided On : 31-03-1949

Advocates:
R.J. Thakor and N.C. Shah - for Appellants. A.G. Desai and D.V. Patel - for Respondents 1 and 2, respectively.

Headnote:

Surrender - Joint Family Property - 1925 Indian Limitation Act, Section 141 - The court discussed the doctrine of surrender in Hindu law and its implications on the succession of joint family property. It emphasized the effacement of the widow's interest and the acceleration of succession, rejecting the argument that adverse possession by other heirs could render the surrender ineffective. The judgment clarified that the surrender operates as civil death of the widow, bringing in the applicability of Section 141 of the Indian Limitation Act. The court also addressed the entitlement of immediate possession to the next reversioners upon the execution of the surrender, emphasizing the destruction of the widow's life estate and the removal of the impediment between the last full owner and the next full owner.

Fact of the Case:

The suit involved a dispute over the partition and possession of joint family property. The plaintiffs claimed to be the next reversioners of Shankarbhai and sought their half share in the property held by the defendants. The defendants contended that there was no severance of joint status and that they were entitled to the entire joint family property.

Finding of the Court:

The trial Judge decreed the plaintiffs' suit, ruling that the surrender in their favor entitled them to immediate possession of Shankarbhai's half share, unaffected by adverse possession against the widow. The High Court upheld the trial Court's findings, emphasizing the validity of the deed of surrender and the plaintiffs' entitlement to immediate possession.

Issues: The key issues revolved around the validity and implications of the deed of surrender executed by the widow, including the effect of adverse possession by other heirs and the entitlement to immediate possession by the next reversioners.

Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the interpretation of the doctrine of surrender in Hindu law, emphasizing the effacement of the widow's interest and the acceleration of succession. It rejected the argument that adverse possession could render the surrender ineffective and clarified the entitlement of immediate possession to the next reversioners upon the execution of the surrender.

Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the trial Court's decree in favor of the plaintiffs and upholding their entitlement to immediate possession of the joint family property.

Judgement

FACTS :- The patties to the suit are represented in the following genealogical table :

One Jijibhai had two sons, Tribhovan and Kashibhai. Tribhovan who died before 1914 had a son Mathurbhai who died in 1924 leaving a son Punjabhai. The Deputy Nazir was appointed as the guardian of Punjabhai on 29th November 1924, and he went into possession of the family property in 1925. Punjabhai attained majority in 1929. Punjabhai died in 1931 leaving two sons Natvarlal and Kavjibhai (defendants 1 and 2). The Deputy Nazir was appointed as the guardian of the property of defendants 1 and 2. Kashibhai died in 1914 leaving a son Shantserbhai and a daughter Ruxmani. Shankerbhai died in 1922 issueless, leaving a widow Kashibai (defendant 3). Ruxmani died leaving two sons, Dadubhai and Rajnikant (plaintiffs 1 and 2).

Defendant 3 filed a suit in 1926 alleging that she had adopted one Shivabhai in 1924 and claimed that he was entitled to half the share in the joint family property and for partition and possession. This suit was dismissed in 1927, the Court holding that the adoption was invalid.

Ruxmani filed a suit in 1930 for a declaration that she was the next reversioner of Shankarbhai and also for a declaration that there was a severance of joint status in 1913 between Mathurbhai and Kashibhai. The suit went in appeal to the High Court which gave a declaration to Ruxmani that there was a severance of joint status in 1913 and Mathurbhai and Shankerbhai continued to be in possession of the joint family property as tenants-in-common.

The plaintiffs filed the present suit against the defendants on 22nd September 1941, for partition and separate possession of their one half share in the properties in the hands of defendants 1 and 2. The plaintiffs contended that they were the next reversioners of Shankarbhai, that Shankarbhai was entitled to half the property on the severance of the joint status in 1913, that Kashibai, his widow, succeeded to him. and was entitled to the property in her right as a widow, that she surrendered her interest in the property as a widow by a deed of surrender, that succession opened up immediately on the execution of the deed of surrender on 30th January 1941, and that they were entitled to their half share in the property which was in the hands of the Deputy Nazir who was the guardian, of the property of defendants 1 and 2. Defendants 1 and 2 contended that there was no severance, that on the death of Shankarbhai, Mathurbhai became the sole surviving coparcener, that Punjabhai succeeded him, and after him, defendants 1 and 2 were entitled to the possession of the whole of the joint family property.

The trial Judge decreed the plaintiffs suit, observing as follows in his judgment :

"The question, therefore, that arises for determination is whether the plaintiffs are postponed in spite of the surrender in their favour from getting possession of Shankarbhais half share till after Bai Kasfais death In case adverse possession against her is proved. In my opinion the surrenderees are not so postponed since their light to possession arises immediately on surrender in their favour and they are not affected by the circumstance of adverse possession, if any, existing against the widow. Indeed in the case reported in AIR (22) 1935 Mad p. 664 cited for the defence it is observed that the effect of a surrender is practically that of a conveyance, that if the widow conveys her life estate to an alienee he (the alienee) evidently cannot be in a better position than the widow that adverse possession against her in that case be relied upon by the person in possession against the alienee and that, therefore, adverse possession against the widow in a case of surrender or of divesting her of the estate on remarriage would and ought to continue till her life-time and more so when there is no article similar to Art. 141, Limitation Act providing for the case of a surrender or the case of divesting of the estate on remarriage but in a sim

























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