The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and application of S. 6 and S. 19 of the Limitation Act, regarding legal disability and acknowledgments to save limitation. The judgment also highlights the principles of partnership law under S. 37, Partnership Act, 1932, regarding interest on partnership assets.

Chagla, C.J. :- This is an appeal from a decree passed by the Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Belgaum, is a partnership action, and the facts leading up to this litigation may be briefly stated.

2. A partnership was started between the plaintiffs father and defendant 1 in 1904 and the plaintiffs father died on 30th April 1927. The plaintiff filed the suit from which this appeal arises for dissolution of partnership and for accounts alleging that even after the death of his father the partnership continued. On 23rd August 1935, the plaintiff applied for amending the plaint for alleging an alternative cause of action, and the alternative cause of action was that in the event of its being hold that there was no subsisting partnership after the death of the plaintiffs father, accounts should be taken on the footing that the partnership stood die solved on the death of the plaintiffs father. That application was rejected by the trial Court, and the trial Court holding that there was no subsisting partnership after the death of the plaintiffs father, dismissed the plaintiffs suit. An appeal was preferred to this Court, being first Appeal No. 264 of 1938. This Court took the view that the Court below was in error in not granting the amendment. It took the same view as-the trial Court with regard to the original cause of action, pleaded by the defendants. But Divatia, J. in delivering the judgment of the Court thought that it was open to the plaintiff at its inception to plead an alternative cause of action which was inconsistent with the first cause of action, and if that were possible, there was no reason why an amendment should not be permitted to plead an inconsistent cause of action at a subsequent stage of the suit. It was then urged upon Divatia, J. that the question on limitation would have to be considered. Divatia, J., realised the force of that argument, but he observed that it was not possible for the Court to go into the question of limitation and therefore, as I read the judgment, Divatia, J., was under the impression that the trial Court would go into the question as to whether the plaintiffs cause of action would have been barred at the date the amendment was applied for, namely, 23rd August 1935; and after considering that and if it was not so barred, the amendment should be allowed. But Divatia, J. then went on actually to make the order allowing the amendment but made this order conditional upon the question of limitation being considered by the Court below. Now, when the matter went back to the trial Court, both the parties proceeded on the assumption that the amendment had already been made. The defendants contended that the amendment could not relate back to the filing, of the suit and therefore, limitation should be considered as from the date of the amendment. The plaintiff contended that the amendment did relate back to the date of the filing of the suit, and if the suit was not barred, the alternative cause of action asked for would also be in time. The learned Judge took the view that it did relate back to the data of the filing of the suit, that the suit was in time and that, therefore, no question of limitation arose. Now, Mr. Datar before us has very fairly conceded that it is not open to him to argue that the amendment could not relate back to the filing of the suit, and what he has urged and urged very strenuously is that the proper effect to be given to the judgment of the High Court is that we must consider whether the cause of action was barred on 23rd August 1935, when the application for amendment was made, and if we corns to that conclusion we should hold that the learned Judge was in error is allowing the amendment. Unfortunately it is too late in the day to put forward this argument. This argument was in fact not presented to the Court below but as I have already said, parties proceeded on the assumption that the order for amendment was made and Divatia, J.s own judgment does indicat