The central legal point established in the judgment is the application of the principle of justice, equity, and good conscience to statutory provisions, and the determination of the landlord's right to re-enter the demised premises without the requirement of notice in case of non-payment of rent.

CHAGLA, C.J. :- This is an appeal from a judgment of the learned Judge, Small Cause Court of Poona, exercising appellate powers, confirming a decree for ejectment passed by the learned Extra Joint Subordinate Judge at Poona. The ejectment was sought by the landlord on the ground of non-payment of rent, and the main point that has been urged before us by Mr. Abhyankar and Mr. Kotwal is that inasmuch as so notice was given by the landlord determining the lease on the ground of non-payment of rent, there was no forfeiture and there was no right on the part of the landlord to re-enter the demised premises.

2. Now, the law with regard to forfeiture is contained in S. 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, and a forfeiture results and a lease is determined in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that on breach thereof the lessor may re-enter, or in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself, or the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening of such event; and prior to the amendment of this sub-section by Act XX [20] of 1929 this sub-section further provided "and in any of these cases the lessor or his transferee does some act showing his intention to deter, mine the lease." By Act xx (20) of 1929 this sub-section was amended and the amended sub-section now reads : "and in any of these cases the lessor or his transferee gives notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease."

Therefore, as the law stands today, a notice given by the landlord is a condition precedent to forfeiture and the right of re entry. But Act, XX (20) of 1929, by S. 63, restricted the operation of this amendment and the restriction was that this amendment was not to affect the terms or incidents of any transfer of property made or effected before 1st April 1930. Now, when we turn to the lease in this case, which was executed before the Transfer of Property Act came into force in 1882, one of the terms of that lease was that the landlord was given the right to re-enter on the tenant failing to pay the rent agreed upon. Therefore, it is clear that if this amendment was to be made applicable to the lease which was entered into long prior to 1st April 1930 it would undoubtedly affect the terms and incidents of the contract between the landlord and the tenant, because by the amendment the right of the landlord would be considerably curtailed. Instead of being able to re-enter as soon as there was a default in payment of rent, he could only re-enter provided he gave a notice expressing his intention to determine the lease, and, therefore, in our opinion it is clear that S. 63 of Act XX (20) of 1929 does not make the amendment retrospective and restricts its operation to transactions that took place after 1st April 1930.

3. But in this case as the tease was entered into prior to 1882, we have also got to consider S. 2, T.P. Act. That section provides that "nothing herein contained shall be deemed to affect" (now I am citing the relevant sub-clause) "any right or liability arising out of a legal relation constituted before this Act comes into force, or any relief in respect of any such right or liability." Therefore, any right that the landlord had, or any relief to which he became entitled in respect of such right, could not be affected by the coming into force of this Act if that right had been acquired prior to the coming into operation of this Act, or he had been entitled to the relief in respect of such tight prior to the coming into operation of this Act. Therefore, apart from Act XX (20) of 1929, by S. 2 the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act do not apply to transactions which were in force prior to the coming into operation of the Act if those provisions were likely to affect any rights or liabilities-or any relief in respect of such rights. This position is not seri