The main legal point established in the judgment is that limitation begins to run when the right first accrues, and subsequent defaults do not give rise to new rights or extend the limitation period. The judgment also emphasizes the exception of waiver or condonation by the decree-holder, which could affect the running of limitation.

CHAGLA, C.J.-The question referred to this Full Bench is whether in case of an instalment decree providing that on the failure of payment of certain instalments the whole amount due may be recovered, the decree-holder is entitled to exercise his option to recover the whole amount then recoverable, notwithstanding that the first default may have occurred more than three years before the filing of the execution application.

2. The facts giving rise to the raising of this question may be briefly stated. An award decree was passed on 14th August 1931. The decree was for Rs. 6,900 and it provided for payment by annual instalments of Rs. 1,000 with interest; the fire of such instalments was made payable in March or April 1932 and each subsequent instalments on the succeeding March or April of every year. It was also provided that in default of payment of any two instalments the plaintiffs might recover the whole balance that would remain over after deduction of payments received in one lump sum by sale of the mortgaged property. A sum of Rs. 1,195 was paid by the judgment-debtor on 24th November 1931. A further sum of Rs. 1260 was paid on 14th November 1932. On 11th April 1933, a sum of Rs. 105 was paid by the judgment-debtor. On 5th October 1936, the decree-holder filed a darkhast claiming that in view of a default in payment of instalments the whole decretal amount had become payable and claiming that amount. That darkhast was dismissed for non prosecution on 21st December 1936. A further darkhast was filed on 15th November 1938, and the executing Court held that the datkhast was barred by limitation.

3. Now, in order to determine whether the darkhast of 16th November 1938, was or was not in time, what we have to consider is whether the darkhast preferred on 5th October 1936, was within time. It is not disputed that the default in payment of two instalments did take place in March-April 1933 because the two sums which were paid of Rs. 1,195 and Rs. 1,260 were not the full amounts of the instalment and interest payable under the decree. It cannot be seriously disputed that the article under the Indian Limitation, Act which applies is Art. 181 and the period of, limitation laid down under that article is three years and limitation begins to run from the time when the right to apply accrues. If the right to apply accrued to the decree-holder in March-April 1933, then clearly the darkhast which was filed on 5th October 1936, was not within time, and really the very narrow question that we have to consider is whether on 5th October 1936, when the decree-holder applied for the execution of the decree for the whole amount, be bad a subsisting right which he could enforce by the darkhast. It is well settled that the right which is given to a decree holder under a decree to enforce the payment of the full decretal amount in default of payment of any instalment is a right given to the decree-holder for his benefit. He may or he may not enforce it. Although a default may take place, he may treat the decree as still a decree for instalments and be may phrase in execution his right to obtain the instalments as and when they fall due.

4. Mr. Patwardhans contention before us has been that it was on 5th October 1936, that the decree-holder exercised his option to enforce the decree by claiming the whole amount due under the decree and therefore limitation did not begin to run till that date. Mr. Patwardhan says that although the default took place in March-April 1933, it was open to the decree-holder not to exercise his right given to him under the decree, and till he exercised the right no question of limitation could arise. It is perfectly true that the decree-holder exercised his right on 6th October 1933. But the question that we have to consider is whether when he exercised his right that right was subsisting or whether the remedy for that tight had been barred by the statute oil limitation. If a right accrued to the decree holder in M