The duty of the Industrial Court to decide only disputes referred under S. 73 and the distinction between challenging a specific reference and challenging the validity of the Industrial Court.

CHAGLA, C.J. - This is an appeal from an order of Tendolkar, J., by which he dismissed the appellants petition for an order under S. 45, Specific Relief Act on two preliminary grounds. The petitioners are eight manufacturers and employers of labour in the city of Surat, and there was a dispute between them and their employees, and the Provincial Government on 4th May 1948, referred the dispute to the arbitration of the Industrial Court under S. 73, Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. The petitioners contended in their petition that as their industry was not a cotton textile industry, the dispute between them and their employees did not constitute an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act and the reference made toy the Provincial Government to the Industrial doubt was not a valid reference and the Industrial Court had no authority and jurisdiction to entertain the reference and to decide the reference. Thereupon they sought from this Court an order under S. 45 calling upon the Industrial Court to forbear from arbitrating upon the industrial dispute referred to them by the Provincial Government. Tandolkar J., took the view that the provisions of S. 46, Specific Relief Act were not complied with and therefore the petition was bound to fail.

2. It is perfectly true that the provisions of S. 46 are mandatory in their character and a non-compliance of those provisions would result in a petition under S. 45 being dismissed. What S. 46 requires is that the application under S. 45 has to be founded on an affidavit of the person injured and that affidavit has to state his right in the matter in question, his demand of justice and the denial thereof, and the view that the learned Judge below took was that in the affidavit made by the petitioners in support of their petition there was no averment that they had demanded justice and that justice had been denied. In my opinion, S. 46 does not require (that there must be used in the affidavit of the petitioner specific words to the effect that he had (demanded justice and justice had been denied.

What the section requites is a substantial compliance with the provisions thereof, and it from the affidavit it clearly appears that the petitioner had demanded justice and that justice had been denied, the mere absence of the exact words in the affidavits would not result in the petition being dismissed. Turning to the affidavit of Surajram Dayaram Chevli and Dr. Amichand) Shah, we find that in para. 2 of the affidavit the deponents stated that they appeared before the Industrial Court and contended that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute referred to in the notification of 4th May 1948, and in para. 3 they further proceed to state that the Industrial Court however proceeded with the references. In my opinion, reading paras. 2 and 3 together, it is perfectly clear that a demand for justice was made by the petitioners from the Industrial Court inasmuch as he was asked not to proceed with the references because he had no jurisdiction, and when ha did proceed notwithstanding this protest, there was a denial of justice about which the deponents were complaining is the affidavit. There is also the affidavit of Surajram Hathiwalla where he points out that at the adjourned meeting before the Industrial Court on 4th October 1948, a point was taken that the factories of the petitioners were not cotton textile concerns, and the Court expressed its opinion in favour of the petitioners. But the matter was adjourned in order to enable the Industrial Court to refer the matter to the Government to inquire into the nature of the industry, and subsequently the petitioners were informed that the hearing would go on and the data was fixed as to when the reference would go on. Here again, there is an averment of the objection taken by the petitioners to the jurisdiction and authority of the Industrial Court and the ultimate decision of the Court to proceed with the reference. Therefore,