The time taken for preparing the decree, including the period between the pronouncement of the judgment and the signing of the decree, should be excluded under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, provided it is properly required and not due to the appellant's default.

Chagla, C.J. :- The question that we have to consider in this Full Bench is whether the time that elapses between the pronouncement of the judgment and the signing of the decree should be excluded under S. 12 (2), Limitation Act, and if it is to be excluded whether it should be excluded wholly or should be excluded under certain limitations. The facts that give rise to this Full Bench may be briefly stated. The trial Court delivered its judgment in Ahmedabad on 1-5-1948. The decree was signed on 29-6-1918. The plaintiffs filed the appeal to the District Court on 4-8-1948, and the question that arose was whether the appeal was in time. The learned District Judge took the view that the appeal was out of time and the same view was taken by Dixit, J., in second appeal. Dixit, J., gave leave under the Letters Patent and the matter came before a Divisional Bench which referred the question to a Full Bench. A further fact may be stated which is also material that the plaintiffs applied in this case for certified copies of the judgment and the decree on 17-6-1948. The certified copies were ready on 7-7-1948. The appeal would only be in time if the period between May 1 and 29-6-1918, a period of 59 days, is to be excluded. If that period is not to be excluded, then the appeal would be out of time.

2. Now, before considering the authorities which were cited at the bar, it would be perhaps better to look at this section itself and to see what is the true position under that section on an interpretation of that section in the light of the language used by the Legislature. Section 12 (2) provides that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, (and I am using the material words) the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree appealed from shall be excluded. It is well settled that the time requisite is not the time actually taken but it is the time properly required. The question that raises certain amount of difficulty is whether the time that is required for preparing a decree is a time of which it could be said that it is a time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree.

Two views are possible. One view is that the time taken for preparing the original, of which a copy is to be obtained, must necessarily be the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the original. This view puts greater emphasis on the expression "requisite" than on the expression "obtaining" used in this subsection. The other view is that unless the appellant takes some step in order to obtain a copy of the decree, it could not be said that the time which expired before he took that step was a time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree. In other words, although the decree was not ready, if the appellant did not apply for a copy, the time taken for preparing the decree could not be excluded, because the appellant had not taken any step for obtaining the decree.

In our opinion, equal emphasis should be placed on both the expressions used in this sub-section. What has got to be excluded is the time which is properly required, and the time which has got to be so excluded is the time which is necessary for obtaining a copy of the decree. It is difficult to understand why the action on the part of the appellant in applying for a copy of the decree should be a decisive factor in considering whether time should be excluded under this sub-section or not. It is also difficult to understand why an appellant should apply for a copy of a decree which is non-existent and which has not yet been prepared or signed by the Judge It would seem that if the appellant had applied for a copy of a decree which was not really, then the time taken up to prepare the decree would have been excluded, but merely because he did not apply for a copy that time should not be excluded.

It seems to us that it is rather futile on the part of the appellant to apply for a copy when in fact the original is not ready and when in fact no copy of the original could be giv