HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
CHAGLA, GAJENDRAGADKAR, JJ.
Canara Bank, Ltd.
Versus
Warden Insurance Co., Ltd.
Civil Appln. No.1484 of 1951
Decided On : 14-01-1952
{'KEYWORD': 'LIMITATION ACT', 'SUBJECT': 'APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 5 TO APPEALS UNDER SPECIAL LAWS', 'ACT SECTION LIST': ['SECTION 3', 'SECTION 4', 'SECTION 5', 'SECTION 9 TO 18', 'SECTION 22', 'SECTION 29(2)'], 'SUMMARY': 'The Bombay High Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which allows for the condonation of delay in filing appeals, does not apply to appeals under special laws unless the special law expressly provides for its application. The Court interpreted Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, which deals with the applicability of the Limitation Act to special laws, and found that it only makes Sections 3, 4, 9 to 18, and 22 applicable to special laws, unless the special law expressly excludes them. The Court rejected the argument that Section 5 applies proprio vigore to all appeals, as it found that the language of Section 5 does not support such an interpretation. The Court also noted that the Legislature had expressly applied Section 5 to certain statutes, while excluding it from others, indicating that the application of Section 5 to special laws is a matter of legislative intent.'}
Fact of the Case:
An appeal was filed under the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, two days beyond the 60-day limitation period prescribed by the Act. The petitioners sought to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to appeals under special laws unless the special law expressly provides for its application.
Issues: Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to appeals under special laws.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court interpreted Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and found that it only makes Sections 3, 4, 9 to 18, and 22 applicable to special laws, unless the special law expressly excludes them. The Court also found that the language of Section 5 does not support the argument that it applies proprio vigore to all appeals.
Final Decision: The Court dismissed the petition and held that the appeal was barred by limitation.
CHAGLA, C.J. :- This civil application raises a very interesting question of the law of limitation. An order fixing the compensation was passed by a special officer under S.8(1), Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948. This was done on 28-12-1950. Sub-section (3) of S.8 provides that an appeal shall lie against the decision of that officer, and in this case the appeal lay to this Court. The appeal in fact was preferred on 28-2-1951. Section 8(3) provides that such appeal shall be made within a period of 60 days from the date of the decision. The appeal was out of time by two days. The petitioners applied that delay should be condoned under S.5, Limitation Act, as they had sufficient cause for the delay, and the question that arises for our determination is whether S.5 applies to an appeal provided under the Land Requisition Act.
2. What calls for our interpretation in the first instance is S.29(2), Limitation Act. The section assumed its present form in 1922. Before that amendment there was considerable conflict between the different High Courts as to the true interpretation of this sub-section, and in order to resolve the conflict the Legislature amended the sub-section in 1922. As it stands now it provides :
"(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application, a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by Sch.I, the provisions of S.3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law -
(a) the provisions contained in Ss.4, 9 to 18 and 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. ..."
3. The first question is whether the special law as embodied in the Land Requisition Act contains a period of limitation for the appeal provided therein which is different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule of the Limitation Act. The contention of Mr. Adarkar is that sub-s.(2) only applies when you find a period of limitation laid down in the first schedule and a special law alters or modifies that period, and inasmuch as the Limitation Act does not provide for a period of limitation in respect of an appeal from a special officer to the High Court, S.29(2) has no application to this particular special law. In our opinion, that is not the correct interpretation to put upon the language used by the Legislature, viz. "a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule." The period of limitation may be different under two different circumstances. It may be different if it modifies or alters a period of limitation fixed by the first schedule to the Limitation Act. It may also be different in the sense that it departs from the period of limitation fixed for various appeals under the Limitation Act. If the first schedule to the Limitation Act omits laying down any period of limitation for a particular appeal and the special law provides a period of limitation, then to that extent the special law is different from the Limitation Act. We are conscious of the fact that the language used by the Legislature is perhaps not very happy, but we must put upon it a construction which will reconcile the various difficulties caused by the other sections of the Limitation Act and which will give effect to the object which obviously the Legislature had in mind, because if we were to give to S.29(2) the meaning which Mr. Adarkar contends for, then the result would be that even S.3 of the Limitation Act would not apply to this special law. The result would be that although an appeal may be barred by limitation, it would not be liable to be dismissed under S.3. If possible we must try and avoid such a startling result and we are sure that the Legislature did not intend that such a result should come about by the langua
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.