HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
CHAGLA, J.
Lingangouda Marigouda
Versus
Lingangouda Fakirgouda
Civil Revn. Appln. No.578 of 1951,
Decided On : 08-07-1952
LIMITATION ACT - ART.62 - ART.120 - MONEY RECEIVED FOR PLAINTIFF'S USE - STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF ART.62 - EQUITABLE CLAIM - SUIT WITHIN TIME.
Fact of the Case:
Plaintiff and defendant No.2 paid a moiety of assessment to the Sangli State, while defendant No.1 paid the other moiety. The State ordered a refund of the assessment, but instead of refunding half to the plaintiff and defendant No.2 and the other half to defendant No.1, the State refunded the whole amount to defendant No.1. Plaintiff filed a suit claiming his share of the refund on behalf of himself and defendant No.2.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that Art.120, and not Art.62, applied to the case. The court found that the money was not received by defendant No.1 for the plaintiff's use, and that the plaintiff had an equitable claim to the money. Therefore, the suit was within time.
Issues: Whether Art.62 or Art.120 of the Limitation Act applied to the case.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that Art.62 should be strictly construed, and that the money was not received by defendant No.1 for the plaintiff's use. The court also held that the plaintiff had an equitable claim to the money, and that therefore Art.120 applied.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the revision application and upheld the decision of the District Judge.
ORDER :-This revision application raises a question of limitation. The plaintiff and defendant No.2 on the one hand and defendant No.1 on the other paid to the Sangli State assessment in the sum of Rs.582-6-4. The plaintiff and defendant No.2 paid a moiety as they were liable to pay and defendant No.1 paid the other moiety. On June 4, 1938, the Sangli State ordered that this amount of assessment which was paid should be refunded, and instead of refunding half to plaintiff and defendant No.2 and the other half to defendant No.1, the State refunded the whole amount to defendant No.1. On April 6, 1943, the plaintiff filed the suit claiming on his behalf and on behalf of defendant No.2 the half share, viz, Rs.291-3-2. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs suit holding it was barred by limitation. The learned District Judge who has reversed the decision held that the suit is in time and decreed it, and the question that arises is whether the suit is governed by Art.62 or Art.120. If it is governed by art.62, then it is out of time. If it is governed by Art.120, then it is within time.
2. A preliminary objection is taken by Mr. Hungund that no revision appliction lies because the decision of the District Judge was a decision with jurisdiction, and however erroneous it might be in law, it cannot be corrected by this Court. There is considerable force in Mr. Hungunds contention. Mr. Datar has relied on a recent Privy Council decision in - Joy Chand Lal Babu v. Kamalaksha Chaudhury, 76 Ind App 131 (PC) and Mr. Datar says that that decision lays down that in every case of limitation and res judicata, if the decision of the lower Court is erroneous in law, the High Court can correct it in revision under S.115. The claim made by Mr. Datar for the jurisdiction of the High Court under S.115 seems to be rather wide and extensive, but undoubtedly there, are observations in the judgment of their Lordships which seem to support that contention. On the other hand, there is a judgment of the Privy Council in the same volume at p.67 - Venkatagiri Ayyangar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras, 76 Ind App 67 (PC), which lays down the principles which should govern the application of S.115, and if those principles are applied to the present case, it is difficult to see how a decision on a question of limitation would attract the application of S.115. The matter is not free from difficulty. I prefer not to express any opinion on this application, because in my opinion even assuming I had jurisdiction under S.115 to interfere with the decision of the learned District Judge, this is not a case where I should interfere because in. my opinion the decision of the learned Judge seems to be correct in law.
2a. Now, the question is whether the moiety of the sum of Rs.582-6-4 was received by defendant No.1 for plaintiffs use. It is only if it was received for the plaintiffs use that the money would be payable by defendant No.1 to the plaintiff. Now, the language used in art.62 is the language taken from English cases. But there is one important fact that should be borne in mind that in England it was necessary for the Courts to find an implied contract in order that suits may be maintainable. A suit in personam would not lie unless there was an express or implied contract and therefore the Courts were at pains in many cases to infer or imply a contract so that the plaintiff should not fail by reason of a defect in procedure. Therefore, in the Elglish books there are many cases where an implied contract has been arrived at in order to sustain the action. In India there never was any reason to stretch a point in favour of the plaintiff, in order to sustain his action. As Courts here were both Courts of law and equity, the question of formal procedure which was of such importance at one stage in England never troubled our Courts and our Judges and therefore it is always safe to follow English decisions in construing Art.62. If anything, in India
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