The Industrial Tribunal and the Labour Appellate Tribunal have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon a complaint filed by a workman under Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, alleging that his dismissal was illegal and unjustified.

CHAGLA, C.J.: - This is a petition by a dismissed employee of the Surat Municipal Borough complaining that the decision given by the Industrial Tribunal and the Labour Appellate Tribunal was without jurisdiction and asking us to set right that decision by a prerogative writ. The facts briefly are that the petitioner joined the Surat Municipal Borough on November 4, 1949. There was a dispute between the Municipality and its workmen which was referred to the Industrial Tribunal on May 15, 1950. While that dispute was pending before the Tribunal, the Surat Municipal Borough dismissed the petitioner. An application was made by the petitioner under S.33A to the Tribunal complaining against his dismissal by the Surat Municipal Borough. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the Surat Municipal Borough was justified in terminating the services of the petitioner. There was an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the Labour Appellate Tribunal upheld the decision of the Industrial Tribunal.

2. A very able argument has been advanced before us by Mr. Phadke as to the scope and extent of the inquiry contemplated by S.33A before the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Section 33 of the Act prohibits an employer from altering to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in any pending dispute the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceeding, and also prohibits him from discharging or punishing, whether by dismissal or otherwise any workman concerned in such dispute; and it is common ground that the petitioner was concerned in the pending dispute before the Tribunal. Now, this prohibition is not absolute. It would be open to the employer to alter the conditions of the workmen to their prejudice or even discharge or punish them if he obtained the express permission in writing of the conciliation officer, Board or Tribunal. If he did not obtain such a sanction and he acted to the prejudice of the workmen, a penalty is provided under S.31 and the penalty is that any employer who contravenes the provisions of S.33 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which. may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. Therefore, reading Ss.33 and 31, no difficulty presents itself. The Legislature has chosen to protect the rights of workmen pending industrial disputes by prohibiting the employer from doing anything to their prejudices without the express sanction of the conciliation officer, Board or Tribunal before whom there is a pending reference. In this particular case it is again common ground that the petitioner was discharged by the Surat Municipal Boroug without the permission of that Tribunal an in having done so the Municipal Borough undoubtedly contravened the provisions of S.33. It would also appear that by doing so it rendered itself liable to be prosecuted and punished under S.31.

Then we come to S.33A, the interpretation of which may suggest certain difficulties. The headnote of that section is, "Special provision for adjudication as to whether conditions of service, etc., changed during pendency of proceedings", and the section provides that "Where an employer contravenes the provisions of S.33 during the pendency of proceedings before a Tribunal, any employee aggrieved by such contravention, may make a complaint in writing, in the prescribed " manner to such Tribunal and on receipt of such complaint that Tribunal shall adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it, in accordance with the provisions of this Act and shall submit its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly."

It was under this section that the petitioner made a complaint to the Tribunal and it was acting under this section that the Tribunal made its award. The contention of Mr. Phadke is that the scope and ambit of an inquiry under this section is limited and confined to a mere in