CHAGLA, C.J. :- This appeal arises ou1 of a suit filed by the plaintiff for a declaration that two orders of excommunication passed by defendant 1, who is the Head Priest of the Dawoodi Bohra Community, on 28-2-1934, and 28-4-1948, were void, illegal and of no effect, and also claiming damages from defendant 1.

2. The matter came before Shah, J. who raised two preliminary issues. The plaintiffs contention was that the excommunication was bad in view of the Bombay Prevention of Excommunication

Act (Bom Act 42 of 1949), having come into operation on 1-11-1949. The contention of defendant 1 on that was that inasmuch as the orders of excommunication were passed prior to 1-11-1949, the Act had no application, and also that the Act was ultra vires inasmuch as it contravened certain provisions of the Constitution. The learned Judge, therefore, raised two issues, whether the Act was ultra vires and the other was whether the Act was retrospective. The learned Judges findings on both the issues were against defendant 1. He held that the Act applied and also that the Act was not ultra vires. It is from these two findings that this appeal is preferred, and the first question that arises is as to the operation of the Act.

3. In order to understand the contention of defendant 1, it is necessary to consider the object of the Legislature in passing this legislation and the language used by the Legislature in giving effect to its intention and object. The Act is described as an Act to prohibit excommunication in the Province of Bombay, and in the Preamble it draws attention to the practice prevailing in certain communities of excommunicating its members, and it points out that the practice of excommunication results in the deprivation of legitimate right and privileges of the members of the communities. Then the Preamble emphasises the spirit of changing times and points out that it is expedient to stop the practice of excommunication in the public interest. Therefore, this is the object as set out by the Legislature itself with which this legislation was passed.

4. Section 2 is the defining section, and it defines "community" as a group, the members of which are connected together by reason of the fact that by birth, conversion or the performance of any religious rite they belong to the same religion or religious creed and includes a caste or sub-caste. "Excommunication" is defined as the expulsion of a person from any community of which he is a member depriving him of rights and privileges which are legally enforceable by a suit of civil nature by him or on his behalf as such member, and the Explanation states what are the rights and privileges to which reference is made in the definition of "excommunication" and the rights and privileges are those which are legally enforceable by a suit of civil nature, and the Explanation points out what rights will be included in this expression "rights and privileges", and some of the rights mentioned are the right to office or property or to worship in any religious place or a right of burial or cremation; and S.3 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any law, custom or usage for the time being", in force, to the contrary, no excommunication of a member of any community shall be valid and shall be of any effect. Then S.4 is the penal section, and that section penalises any person who does any act which amounts to or is in furtherance of the excommunication of any member of a community.

5. Now, the contention of Mr. Banaji on behalf of defendant 1 is that, looking to the language of the Act, it is clear that the mischief aimed at by the Legislature was orders of excommunication or acts of expelling a member from a community and the Legislature wanted to suppress this particular mischief and therefore it provided that after the Act came into force no order of excommuni-cation or no act of expulsion shall be passed or done by any person whatsoever. Mr. Banaji says that it was not the inte