HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
GAJENDRAGADKAR, VYAS, JJ.
Gangadhar Balkrishna
Versus
Dattatraya Baliram
Second Appeal No.461 of 1949
Decided On : 04-11-1952
COMPROMISE - VOID OR VOIDABLE - O.32, R.7, CIVIL P.C. - EFFECT OF FAILURE TO OBTAIN COURT'S SANCTION - AGREEMENT VOIDABLE AT OPTION OF MINOR - LIMITATION - ART.44, LIMITATION ACT - SUIT BY MINOR TO SET ASIDE TRANSFER BY GUARDIAN - NECESSITY - FULL BENCH DECISION IN - FAKIRAPPA LIMANNA V. LUMANNA (AIR 1920 BOM 1 (FB)) - BINDING.
Fact of the Case:
Plaintiff's father mortgaged a property to the defendant in 1920. After the plaintiff's father's death, the mortgagee sued the plaintiff, represented by his mother as guardian, in 1929. A decree was passed in favor of the mortgagee, and the mortgaged property was sold in execution of the decree. During the execution proceedings, the plaintiff's mother entered into a compromise with the mortgagee, resulting in the sale of the mortgaged property to the defendant for full satisfaction of the decretal claim. The plaintiff became a major in 1941 and filed a suit for redemption and accounts in 1948. The lower courts held that the compromise agreement was void due to the absence of court sanction under O.32, R.7, Civil P.C., and granted the plaintiff's claim for redemption.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the compromise agreement entered into by the plaintiff's mother without the court's sanction under O.32, R.7, Civil P.C., was not void but voidable at the option of the minor. The court interpreted sub-rule 2 of Rule 7 to mean that an agreement made without complying with sub-rule 1 would be binding against all parties except the minor, who could avoid it. The court also held that the plaintiff's suit for redemption was barred by limitation under Article 44 of the Limitation Act, as he failed to bring a suit to set aside the compromise within three years of attaining majority, as required by the Full Bench decision in - Fakirappa Limanna v. Lumanna (AIR 1920 Bom 1 (FB)).
Issues: 1. Whether the compromise agreement entered into by the plaintiff's mother without the court's sanction under O.32, R.7, Civil P.C., was void or voidable. 2. Whether the plaintiff's suit for redemption was barred by limitation under Article 44 of the Limitation Act.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court interpreted sub-rule 2 of Rule 7 of O.32, Civil P.C., to mean that an agreement made without complying with sub-rule 1 would be binding against all parties except the minor, who could avoid it. The court held that the compromise agreement was voidable at the option of the minor, as the guardian had failed to obtain the court's sanction before entering into the agreement. 2. The court held that the plaintiff's suit for redemption was barred by limitation under Article 44 of the Limitation Act, as he failed to bring a suit to set aside the compromise within three years of attaining majority, as required by the Full Bench decision in - Fakirappa Limanna v. Lumanna (AIR 1920 Bom 1 (FB)).
Final Decision: The court allowed the appeal, set aside the decree passed by the lower courts, and dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs throughout. The cross-objections were also dismissed with costs.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J. :- The principal question which arises in this appeal is whether an agreement entered into by the next friend or guardian of a minor without the sanction of the Court is entirely void or is voidable at the option; of the minor. A subsidiary question of limitation also arises, but its decision will depend upon the answer that is given to the first question. Both the Courts below have found that the agreement entered into by the guardian of the plaintiff was void and so his suit was within time. When this matter was argued before Dixit, J., he was apparently disposed to take the view that the agreement in question was voidable and the present suit was barred; but he was requested to refer this matter to a Division Bench because there were conflicting judgments on this point. That is why this case has been referred to a Division Bench and has come before us for final disposal.
2. The facts leading to the present litigation are few and there is really no dispute about it. The property in suit is a field bearing survey No.254 situate at Songir. The plaintiffs father executed a mortgage in respect of this property in favour of the defendant on 27-4-1920, for Rs.400. Subsequently, the plaintiffs father died and the mortgagee sued the plaintiff by his guardian in 1929 (Civil Suit No.350 of 1929). The plaintiffs mother was appointed as the guardian of the plaintiff. A decree was passed in favour of the mortgagee for Rs.200 and costs. The mortgagee took out execution of this decree and filed darkhast No.137 of 1932. He sought to recover the decretal amount by sale of the mortgaged properties. The mortgaged property was valued and the panchas put the value at Rs.700. Pending these darkhast proceedings, the mother of the plaintiff entered into a compromise with the mortgagee as a result of which the mortgaged property was sold to the defendant for Rs.1000 in full satisfaction of his decretal claim. As a result, the decree was entirely satisfied and the darkhast was accordingly disposed of. The mortgagee entered into possession of this property and has been in such possession ever since. The plaintiff became a major in 1941, and on 16-7-1948, he brought the present suit for accounts of the mortgage and for redemption. In respect of the sale executed by his mother in favour of the mortgagee, the plaintiffs case was that the agreement of compromise and the resulting sale effected by his mother who had been appointed as his guardian in suit No.350 of 1929 were void, since the sanction of the Court had not been obtained for the agreement between the guardian and the mortgagee as required by O.32, R.7, Civil P.C. The Courts below have held that the failure to comply with the requirements of O.32, R.7, made the agreement void and so they have granted the plaintiffs claim for redemption and have held that his suit for redemption is within time. If the transaction of sale between the plaintiffs mother and the defendant is void, there is no doubt that his suit is within time. If, however, it is voidable, the question of limitation will have to be decided, because it has been argued before us that even if the transaction is voidable, the present suit should be held to be within time. That is how the principal question which we have to decide is as to the effect of the provisions of O.32, R 7, on the agreement entered into by the plaintiffs mother with the defendant in 1932.
3. Rule 7 of O.32 provides that
"No next friend or guardian for the suit shall, without the leave of the Court, expressly recorded in the proceedings, enter into an agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor with reference to "the suit in which he acts as next friend or guardian."
It is common ground that the plaintiffs mother was appointed as the guardian for the plaintiff in the suit which the mortgagee had filed against him in 1929; and it is not disputed that before the plaintiffs mother entered into a compromise with the mortgagee by which the mortg
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.