The definition of "retrenchment" in S.2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act is wide enough to include the termination of services of workmen by an employer who has ceased to do business.

CHAGLA, C.J.:- This is a petition under Arts.226 and 227 of the Constitution by the President, Barsi Light Railway-mens Union on behalf of the workers of the Railway Company, and the petition came to be filed under the following circumstances. The Railway was taken over by the Union of India on 1-1-1954, and on 11-11-1953, a notice was served by the Railway Company terminating the services of all its workmen.

Some of the employees filed an application under S.15, Payment of Wages Act to the Authority under that Act, contending that they had been retrenched by the Railway Company and therefore they were entitled to compensation under S.25F, Industrial Disputes Act. The Authority held on merits in favour of the employees, but he came to the conclusion that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the application of the petitioners. Having come to that conclusion he dismissed the application, and the petitioners have now come to this Court challenging the decision of the Authority and contending that the Authority wrongly refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in him under the Payment of Wages Act.

2. Now, Mr. Palkhivala on behalf of the Railway Company has very fairly suggested that even assuming we hold that the authority had jurisdiction, the controversy between the parties on merits will not come to an end because Mr. Palkhivalas contention on merits is that no compensation is payable to the workmen under S.25F of the Act. Mr. Palkhivala rightly points out that if we hold that the Authority had jurisdiction and if the Authority passes an order for payment in favour of the workmen, he will have a right to appeal to the District Court.

The decision of the District Judge may be challenged by either party in revision before this Court, and the matter may further be taken up to the Supreme Court, because according to Mr. Palkhivala it is of the utmost importance that either the High Court or the Supreme Court should construe S.25F and determine the rights and liabilities of the parties.

Mr. Palkhivala therefore suggests that on this petition we should decide on merits the contentions of the parties with regard to S.25F. Mr. Palkhivala says he is prepared to give up his contention that the Authority had no jurisdiction. Both parties are agreed that on this petition we should review the judgment of the Authority on merits under S.25F. We have ample jurisdiction to do so under Art.227 of the Constitution, and as we just said both parties are agreed that we should exercise that jurisdiction.

Therefore, instead of this petition proceeding on an issue of jurisdiction, it will proceed on the issue of merits whether the Authority was right in the conclusion that he came to, viz. that the Railway Company was liable to pay compensation to its workers under S.25F of the Act.

Mr. Palkhivala agrees and undertakes on behalf of his clients that in the event of this Court holding that the Railway Company was liable to pay to its workers compensation under S.25F, he will pay such compensation as is payable under that section to each of the workmen who was retrenched by the Railway Company. This undertaking is subject to any appeal he may prefer to the Supreme Court from the decision of this Court and subject to the Railway Company paying the compensation under S.25F only to those employees who are workmen within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act.

Mr. Patel also very fairly gives up the claim of the workmen to wages for January and February 1954 and also the claim to any compensation under S.15(3), Payment of Wages Act. Mr. Palkhivala admits that in the overwhelming number of cases which have come before the Payment of Wages Authority the Railway Company does not dispute that the applicants are workmen within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, but the Company wants to safeguard their right in the event of any stray application being made by a person who is not covered by the definition of "workman" in the Industrial Disputes Act.

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