An order passed by a Company Judge under S. 170 refusing to pass an order of winding up but postponing the petition to a later date when he might consider whether an order of winding up should be made or not, is not a procedural order but it is an order which affects the rights of the petitioner and is appealable under S. 202 of the Companies Act.

CHAGLA, C.J.:- This is an appeal against an order passed by Coyajee J. adjourning the petition for winding up the Hirjee Mills till 15-3-1955, in order to enable certain shareholders to file a suit for the purpose of a declaration that the debentures issued in favour of the petitioners were not valid in law, and the first contention that has been urged in limine is that the appeal is not maintainable.

2. Section 202 of the Companies Act deals with appeals from orders made or decisions given in the matter of the winding up of a company, and it is not disputed that this particular order was made in the matter of the winding up of the Hirjee Mills. That order was made under S.170 of the Companies Act and that section provides that on hearing the petition the Court may dismiss or adjourn the hearing conditionally or unconditionally or make any interim order or any other order it deems fit.

What is urged is that although this is an order under S.170 and although this is an order in the matter of the winding up, inasmuch as the order was made by Coyajee J. on the Original Side of the High Court, this order does not constitute a judgment within the meaning of cl. 15 of the Letters Patent and therefore no appeal lies.

It is contended that the right of appeal under S.202 is conferred subject to the conditions to which appeals may be had from any order or decision of the Court in cases within its ordinary jurisdiction, and it is said that the condition subject to which an appeal lies from a decision of a Judge on the Original Side of the High Court is that the decision must constitute a judgment within the meaning of cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. It is therefore said that as that condition is not satisfied, the appeal is not maintainable.

3. Now, before we turn to the authorities let us look at the scheme of the Companies Act and also consider what is the substantive right of appeal conferred by S.202. It is rather significant to note that the Companies Act provides for specific appeals against various orders and the provisions of these appeals are to be found in various sections. But S.202 is general in its nature and it provides for appeals against any order or decision made or given in the matter of the winding up of a company. Therefore the first fact which strikes one is that the Legislature attached particular importance to the winding up of a company and made orders, made in the course of the winding up, subject to appeal.

Another important fact that must be borne in mind in construing S.202 is that it is not only any order in the matter of the winding up which is made appealable but every decision in the matter of the winding up, and the importance of its being made appealable can be realised from the fact that under S.199 the Act provides that all orders made by a Court may be enforced in the same manner in which decrees of such Court made in any suit pending therein may be enforced.

Therefore the Legislature knew the distinction between an order and a decision, and whereas S.199 talks of how an order should be enforced, S.202 does not limit the right of appeal merely against an order but also confers that right of appeal against a decision.

In our opinion the right conferred is not only a substantial right but a very valuable right and the Court must be anxious not in any way to cut down or impair that right. It is true that under S.202 a right of appeal is not provided against any procedural order or decision which in no way affects the rights or liabilities of parties. The order or decision given by the Court in its winding up must be such as would in any way deprive or affect the right of a party, which would make the party aggrieved by that order, and which would make him desire to come to a higher Court for getting the order passed by the trial Court rectified.

4. There is a very serious difficulty in accepting the contention put forward that the order of Coyajee, J. is appealable only provided it is a judgment within th