The jurisdiction of the Labour Court is determined by the place where the industrial dispute substantially arises, not by the place where the employee approached the employer under the proviso to Section 42(4) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946.

CHAGLA, C.J.:- This petition raises a rather interesting question as to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to try a certain industrial dispute. The facts are very brief. Opponent 5 was employed by the petitioner mills in their branch office in Bombay and his services were terminated on 27-8-1953, when the branch office was closed. He wrote to the registered office of the mills in Ahmedabad complaining of his dismissal and claiming to be reinstated. No reply was sent to this letter and respondent 5 filed an application before the Labour Court for reinstatement and compensation. A point was raised by the petitioner that the Labour Court at Bombay had no jurisdiction to try and dispose of the application made by respondent 5, and the Labour Court made a reference to the Industrial Court under Section 81, Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, and the Industrial Court has held that the Bombay Labour Court had jurisdiction. It is against that decision that the petitioner has come on this petition.

2. Now, under Section 9 the State Government is empowered to constitute one or more Labour Courts having jurisdiction in such local areas as may be specified in such notification, and a Labour Court has been constituted under this section for Bombay; and under Section 77 it is again emphasised that the territorial jurisdiction of Labour Courts shall extend to the local areas for which they are constituted. But neither S.9 nor S.77 throws any light as to what is the jurisdiction in relation to the subject-matter. Both Section 9 and Section 77 deal with the territorial jurisdiction of the Courts, but what we have to consider is in respect of what matters arising within that territorial jurisdiction the Labour Court has been empowered to dispose of application filed before it.

3. What is pointed out by Mr. Bhagwati, on behalf of the petitioner is that S.78 of the Act provides:

"(I) A Labour Court shall have power to-

A. decide-

(a) disputes regarding - (and we are here concerned with cl. (iii) )

(iii) any change made by an employer or desired by an employee in respect of an industrial matter specified in Schedule III and matters arising out of such change";

and the Explanation to that section provides

"A dispute falling under cl. (a) of paragraph A of sub-section (i) shall be deemed to have arisen if within the period prescribed under the proviso to sub-section (4) of S.42, no agreement is arrived at in respect of an order, matter or change referred to in the said proviso".

And when we turn to sub-s. (4) of S.42, it lays down:

"Any employee or a representative union desiring a change in respect of (i) any order passed by the employer under standing orders, or (ii) any industrial matter arising out of the application or interpretation of standing orders, or (iii) an industrial matter specified in Sch. III, shall make an application to the Labour Court":

There is a proviso to this sub-section and the proviso is:

"Provided that no such application shall lie unless the employee or a representative union has an the prescribed manner approached the employer with a request for the change and no agreement has been arrived at in respect of the change within the prescribed period".

4. What is contended is that an industrial dispute only arises when an employee, dissatisfied by any action on the part of the employer approaches the employer in the manner laid down in the proviso to Section 42(4) and no agreement has been reached between the employer and the employee after that approach has been made, and Mr. Bhagwati says that till that approach takes place and the approach is found to be futile, there is no industrial dispute, and, says Mr. Bhagwati, in this case the approach was made at Ahmedabad, the approach did not result in an agreement, and therefore the dispute arose in Ahmedabad and only the Labour Court at Ahmedabad can entertain this application. Turning first to S.42(4) and the proviso, it is clear that the proviso is procedural and it obliges