(Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) Admit. By consent of Counsel and at their request, taken up for hearing and final disposal.

2. The appeal arises from an order of a Learned Single Judge by which the Chamber Summons for amendment of a plaint in a suit for specific performance has been allowed. The First and Second Appellants are Defendants in the suit for specific performance which has been instituted by the First and Second Respondents. The Third Appellant has been impleaded as a party to the suit, in view of the fact that he has entered into an agreement on 2 August 2008 with the First Appellant. The agreement of the Third Appellant is subsequent to the agreement of the original Plaintiff. The Third Appellant claims under the First Appellant and does not claim a title adverse to that of his vendor. The Third Appellant is the father of the Second Appellant.

3. The suit for specific performance has been instituted by the First and Second Respondents against the First and Second Appellants for enforcement of a letter of allotment dated 10 November 2005. The subject matter of the suit for specific performance is a residential flat, Flat No.303, admeasuring 1055 sq.ft. in Sadguru Complex, D-Wing, Phase-I, General A.K.Vaidya Marg, Goregaon (East), Mumbai. On 2 August 2008 an agreement was entered into between the First Appellant and the Third Appellant. The Second Appellant is a partner of the First Appellant, while the Third Appellant is his father. By the proposed amendment, the First and Second Respondents sought to implead the Third Appellant who claims to be a subsequent purchaser. Admittedly, the Third Appellant claims title under the First Appellant and under a subsequent agreement dated 2 August 2008. In addition to the impleadment of the Third Appellant, the First and Second Respondents sought the impleadment of the Third Respondent with whom a licence agreement was entered into by the First Appellant. Now, it is common ground that before the Learned Single Judge an affidavit in reply was filed on behalf of the Appellants stating that the Third Respondent had vacated the premises upon the term of the licence coming to an end. In this view of the matter, during the course of the hearing, Counsel appearing on behalf of the First and Second Respondents, the original Plaintiffs, states that it is not necessary to implead the Third Respondent and that this part of the proposed amendment is consequently not pressed. Hence, the only subsisting issue is as to whether the Learned Single Judge was in error in allowing the impleadment of the Third Appellant and with the consequential amendments which are sought to be pressed.

4. Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, provides that specific performance of a contract may be enforced against a party to the contract or any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract, except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract. In allowing an application for impleadment under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court is required to consider whether the proposed addition is of a party who is either necessary or proper. Now, in a suit for specific performance, when a subsequent purchaser is sought to be impleaded, the true test that has to be applied by the Court is to determine whether the purchaser claims title under the vendor of the Plaintiff or whether, contrariwise, he claims a title independent of or adverse to the title of the vendor. Impleadment is permissible where the party which is proposed to be joined claims under the vendor of the Plaintiff and under a subsequent agreement. This is to be distinguished from a case where a title adverse to or independent of the vendor is sought to be asserted. In the former case, it is but necessary to join the subsequent purchaser in order to ensure that when a decree is passed by the Court at the trial of the suit, the subseq