2014 Supreme(Bom) 436
In the High Court of Bombay at Aurangabad
A.I.S. CHEEMA, J.
Amol Vishwanath Bade
Versus
Dattatraya Dinkar Ghule & Others
Civil Revision Application No. 17 of 2014
Decided On : 20-02-2014
For the Petitioners:S.K. Shinde, Advocate.
For the Respondents:V.D. Salunke, Advocate.
Headnote:Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Sections 2(2) and 47 - Specific Relief Act, Section 28 - Execution of decree passed under Act. - Once amount is paid by decree holder to judgment-debtor within time as per directions of Court, part of decree directing defendant to execute sale deed become enforceable. - It is clear that a decree can be preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of The decree is final when the adjudication completely disposes of the suit. The same decree can be partly preliminary and partly final. In the decree mentioned above, it is partly preliminary as to the portion where there are directions to make payment within particular time. To that extent the decree is preliminary as Section 28 of the Specific Relief. Act, 1963 retains control with the Court passing decree to extend the time or rescind the agreement. Once the amount has been paid within time, nothing remains to be done by the Court passing the decree and part of decree which was final i.e. directions to defendant Nos. 1 and 2 to execute the sale deed, become enforceable.
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Sections 2(10) and 47 - Execution of decree. - Where decree passed was not against third party therefore impleadment of third party in execution of decree not permissible. - It is apparent that the questions raised in the execution proceedings by the petitioner are not questions arising between the parties to the suit or representatives of the parties or purchaser of property in execution of decree. Thus, questions being raised by the petitioner need not really be decided by the Executing Court. Not that the same would make any difference as far as Section 47 of CPC is concerned. Thus, the application filed by the judgment debtor objecting to the execution of the decree should have been rejected on this count. Keeping in view Section 47 of CPC, petitioner could not have been arrayed as party to the execution.
1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for respondent No.1 on caveat. The revision is being disposed of after hearing these parties finally.
2. This revision petition has been filed by the petitioner claiming to be Opponent No.4 in Regular Darkhast No.25/2009 pending before Civil Judge, Junior Division, Pathardi. According to the petitioner, he objected to the execution of the Darkhast on the ground that the decree passed under the Specific Relief Act, 1963 was preliminary decree and so, the same was not executable unless final decree proceedings are drawn up before the trial Court. The executing Court heard the petitioner referring to him as "alleged Judgment Debtor No.4" and after hearing the decree holder also, has rejected the application of the present petitioner.
3. I have heard counsel for petitioner and counsel for respondent No.1. According to learned counsel for petitioner, respondent No.1 Dattatraya had brought suit for specific performance against respondent No.2 Dr. Dilip and respondent No.3 Umrao (arrayed as defendant Nos.1 and 2 in the suit - Regular Civil Suit No.170/1996) before Civil Judge, Junior Division, Pathardi). The suit came to be decreed on 8.3.2002 and the decree has been maintained even till Second Appeal to High Court. Counsel for petitioner submitted that, there was another dispute between respondent No.3 (Judgment Debtor No.2) and his wife Jayshree, the present respondent No.4 (but who was not party to the Civil Suit No. 170/1996) in Family Court at Bandra having No.634/2000 and compromise took place between them. In the said compromise, the respondent No.3, by way of permanent alimony, handed over suit land admeasuring 85 R to respondent No.4, and respondent No.3 executed sale deed dated 27.4.2001 in favour of respondent No.4. Respondent No.4 in turn sold the suit land to petitioner on 29.12.2008. The Second Appeal in the matter was disposed on 3.2.2012 and it is not disputed that the sale deed executed in favour of petitioner on 29.12.2008 was lis pendens in Regular Civil Suit No.170/1996. According to the learned counsel for petitioner, in execution, this petitioner was arrayed as opponent No.4 and thus, he filed the application objecting to the execution.
4. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that, in the matter of Chanda (dead through L.Rs.) Vs. Rattni & anr., reported in 2007 (3) ALL MR 341 (SC), decree under Specific Performance Act has been held to be preliminary and so, according to the learned counsel, it is necessary to draw up a final decree before it can be put to execution. Learned counsel submitted that, under Section 2(10) of Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as CPC for short), petitioner cannot be said to be Judgment Debtor but still claimed that the petitioner had raised the objections under Section 47 of CPC as he had been arrayed in Darkhast as Opponent No.4. It was also argued that, the petitioner has purchased 85 R land whereas suit property under the concerned decree is 35 R and so also it would require division.
5. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 has submitted that the petitioner was purchaser during pendency of the dispute. According to him, although respondent No.3 created third party interest by first transferring the property to his wife and then she transferring the same to petitioner, still the original defendant kept litigating in the appeals. The learned counsel submitted that the decree cannot be said to be preliminary because the decree directed the plaintiff-decree holder to deposit the money within three months and the amount was accordingly deposited and so, it is final decree and the same is executable. According to the learned counsel, the judgment in the matter of "Chanda" (supra) will not help the petitioner as the object is only to protract the litigation so as to deprive the decree holder of fruits of the decree. He placed reliance on Section 2(2) of the CPC to submit that the decree can be partly pre