SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

2014 Supreme(Bom) 365

In the High Court of Bombay at Goa
MRIDULA R. BHATKAR, J.
Aradhana Walkade
Versus
Chandrashekar Vaidya & Another
Criminal Writ Petition No. 126 of 2013
Decided On : 13-02-2014

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Petitioner:S. S. Kantak, Senior Advocate with S.S. Sardesai, Advocate.
For the Respondents:R1, S.D. Lotlikar, Senior Advocate with P. Lotlikar, Advocate.

Headnote:Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 - Sections 2(f), 2(g) and 12 - Complaint under Section 12. - Within purport of "domestic violence" a woman who is a divorcee has remedy available to initiate proceedings under Act. - Under the Act, respondent is never a female but always an adult male. It states that the respondent, who is or who has been in domestic relationship with an aggrieved person. Thus, Section 2(q) also refers to the relationship which is in existence, that is, in the present or which was in the past. Thus, Section 2(q) is in consonance with the terms and phrases used in first half of Section 2(f) of the Act. The verb used in Section 2(f) in the subsequent portion that "when they are related in consanguinity……………." though indicates present tense, the entire section as a whole is to be read in context with Section 2(q) and also 3 - Explanation a(i). Then it is amply clear that legislators while enacting those provisions intended to take account of the present domestic relationship as well as the past domestic relationship. In legislative wisdom on considering the ground realities of the life and the matrimonial relationship and further the responsibility which is required to be shouldered by a woman, the concept of domestic relationship is given wider meaning and thus, relationship which is in existence so also the matrimonial relationship which was in the past both are covered within the purport of Section 2(f) and 2(q). Under sub-section (q) of Section 2, the law makers have deliberately used the word "aggrieved person" and who can take action against the respondent but in the proviso instead of using the term "aggrieved person" the term as "aggrieved wife" is substituted. Thus, the proviso carves out a class of aggrieved persons, that is, (i) an aggrieved wife (ii) female living in relationship. This class of aggrieved persons may also file the complaint against a particular class of respondent which is specified in the proviso, that is, a relative of husband or a male partner. Thus, this provision enables an aggrieved wife or female in relationship to take action under the D.V. Act against relatives of the husband or the male partner. The specific use of the word "aggrieved wife" and further phrases, female living in relationship necessarily refers to a present tense. In the proviso the term an "ex-wife" or an "aggrieved person" is not used, which is found in the principal section of 2(q). Thus, the proviso enables to remove the ambiguity in respect of past matrimonial relationship as it is an exception to the main section and adds more and further remedy to a particular class of an aggrieved person against persons who fall in a specific category i.e. relations of the husband. Thus, an ex-wife has no remedy available against the relatives of the ex-husband. By virtue of the proviso she is not an aggrieved person, though otherwise she is under the Act for taking action against the husband only. Thus, there is no doubt that within the purport of "domestic violence" a woman who is a divorcee has remedy available to initiate the proceedings.

       Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 - Section 3(iv) - Offence of economic abuse. - If an aggrieved person is deprived of maintenance granted by Court, it can be considered as an economic abuse. - Definition of "economic abuse" means that if a woman is deprived of any economic or financial resources to which she is entitled reliefs under the law, or custom whether payable under the order of the Court or otherwise, to her as an aggrieved person out of necessity can be granted. The definition further has mentioned the word "maintenance". Therefore, if there is an order of the Court to pay maintenance to the "aggrieved person" then if such maintenance is stopped or aggrieved person is deprived of such maintenance, it can be considered as an economic abuse. Maintenance also relates back to past matrimonial relationship. Thus Section 3(iv) of the Act also fortifies the interpretation of "domestic relationship." extending to the past relationship. The word "otherwise" used after the order of the Court is again broad and can be stretched for a proper legal interpretation. Thus, the obligation to look after the children can be taken in the sweep of word "otherwise."

Oral Judgment:

1. Rule. Made returnable forthwith. Heard finally at the stage of admission by consent. This Criminal Writ petition involves a question of law as to whether subsistence of marriage is sine qua non for maintainability of a complaint under section 12 of the offence under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005?

2. The petitioner and the respondent got married on 8/8/2001. They had a daughter out of the wedlock. However, unfortunately, the parties were divorced by the order of the Court dated 24/2/2010 passed in Matrimonial Petition No.43/2009/A by the Civil Judge Senior Division, Panaji. At the time of granting decree of divorce, the learned Judge did not pass any order of maintenance, as it was not prayed for at the relevant time. However, after the decree of divorce, the respondent/husband out of love and concern was paying the amount of Rs. 25,000/- for the daughter to the petitioner August 2011. Thereafter, the respondent/husband stopped paying the said amount, from August 2011, the petitioner filed application under section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence (D.V. Act, for short) in the Court of J.M.F.C., Mapusa, as her child was deprived of maintenance and she thereby suffered economic abuse. This case was registered as Criminal Case No. OA./166/DVA/2012/E. And entertained by the J.M.F.C, Mapusa.

3. The respondent appeared in the said matter and he filed reply resisting the question of maintainability of the said criminal case under the D.V. Act. The challenge was given on the sole ground that the divorce between the parties has taken place on 24/2/2010 and as the parties are not legally wedded husband and wife and not sharing the household and therefore provisions of D.V. Act cannot be attracted. The said application challenging maintainability of the provisions of the D.V. Act was contested before the J.M.F.C and was dismissed by the Learned J.M.F.C by its order dated 31/7/2010. The respondent husband thereafter challenged the said order by filing criminal revision before the Addl. Sessions Judge, Mapusa, which was registered as Criminal revision Application No.87/2012/E. The said Criminal Revision application was allowed and the order passed by the learned JMFC upholding maintainability of the complaint under the D.V. Act was quashed and set aside.

4. Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner/wife has filed this criminal writ petition before this Court.

5. The issue directly goes to the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the D.V. Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondent both made legal submissions on the basis of findings given by the Learned Sessions Judge relying on the provisions of the D.V. Act. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the learned Sessions Judge has committed an error in reading and interpreting the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of “InderjitSingh Grewal Vs. State of Punjab and another” [(2011) 12 Supreme Court Cases 588]. The learned JMFC in fact has rightly placed reliance on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of “Smt. Bharati Naik Vs. Shri Ravi Ramnath Halarnkar” [2011 ALL MR (Cri) 224]. Learned counsel submitted that the ratio laid down in the judgment of the learned Single Judge is identical and direct. The learned JMFC has rightly distinguished the case of the “InderjitSingh Grewal” (supra) and has considered the Bombay High Court judgment in proper prospective. Learned counsel submitted that the learned Sessions Judge ought to have relied on the judgment of the Bombay High Court and also the provisions of the D.V. Act. He took me to the various provisions under the D.V. Act, specially to the defining clauses under sections 2 and 3 of the Act.

6. Per Contra, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent husband submitted that the order passed by the Sessions Judge is correct and should be maintained. Learned counsel submitted that the ratio laid down in

























Click Here to Read the rest of this document

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top