In the High Court of Bombay at Goa
MRIDULA R. BHATKAR, J.
Aradhana Walkade
Versus
Chandrashekar Vaidya & Another
Criminal Writ Petition No. 126 of 2013
Decided On : 13-02-2014
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 - Section 3(iv) - Offence of economic abuse. - If an aggrieved person is deprived of maintenance granted by Court, it can be considered as an economic abuse. - Definition of "economic abuse" means that if a woman is deprived of any economic or financial resources to which she is entitled reliefs under the law, or custom whether payable under the order of the Court or otherwise, to her as an aggrieved person out of necessity can be granted. The definition further has mentioned the word "maintenance". Therefore, if there is an order of the Court to pay maintenance to the "aggrieved person" then if such maintenance is stopped or aggrieved person is deprived of such maintenance, it can be considered as an economic abuse. Maintenance also relates back to past matrimonial relationship. Thus Section 3(iv) of the Act also fortifies the interpretation of "domestic relationship." extending to the past relationship. The word "otherwise" used after the order of the Court is again broad and can be stretched for a proper legal interpretation. Thus, the obligation to look after the children can be taken in the sweep of word "otherwise."
1. Rule. Made returnable forthwith. Heard finally at the stage of admission by consent. This Criminal Writ petition involves a question of law as to whether subsistence of marriage is sine qua non for maintainability of a complaint under section 12 of the offence under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005?
2. The petitioner and the respondent got married on 8/8/2001. They had a daughter out of the wedlock. However, unfortunately, the parties were divorced by the order of the Court dated 24/2/2010 passed in Matrimonial Petition No.43/2009/A by the Civil Judge Senior Division, Panaji. At the time of granting decree of divorce, the learned Judge did not pass any order of maintenance, as it was not prayed for at the relevant time. However, after the decree of divorce, the respondent/husband out of love and concern was paying the amount of Rs. 25,000/- for the daughter to the petitioner August 2011. Thereafter, the respondent/husband stopped paying the said amount, from August 2011, the petitioner filed application under section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence (D.V. Act, for short) in the Court of J.M.F.C., Mapusa, as her child was deprived of maintenance and she thereby suffered economic abuse. This case was registered as Criminal Case No. OA./166/DVA/2012/E. And entertained by the J.M.F.C, Mapusa.
3. The respondent appeared in the said matter and he filed reply resisting the question of maintainability of the said criminal case under the D.V. Act. The challenge was given on the sole ground that the divorce between the parties has taken place on 24/2/2010 and as the parties are not legally wedded husband and wife and not sharing the household and therefore provisions of D.V. Act cannot be attracted. The said application challenging maintainability of the provisions of the D.V. Act was contested before the J.M.F.C and was dismissed by the Learned J.M.F.C by its order dated 31/7/2010. The respondent husband thereafter challenged the said order by filing criminal revision before the Addl. Sessions Judge, Mapusa, which was registered as Criminal revision Application No.87/2012/E. The said Criminal Revision application was allowed and the order passed by the learned JMFC upholding maintainability of the complaint under the D.V. Act was quashed and set aside.
4. Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner/wife has filed this criminal writ petition before this Court.
5. The issue directly goes to the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the D.V. Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondent both made legal submissions on the basis of findings given by the Learned Sessions Judge relying on the provisions of the D.V. Act. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the learned Sessions Judge has committed an error in reading and interpreting the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of “InderjitSingh Grewal Vs. State of Punjab and another” [(2011) 12 Supreme Court Cases 588]. The learned JMFC in fact has rightly placed reliance on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of “Smt. Bharati Naik Vs. Shri Ravi Ramnath Halarnkar” [2011 ALL MR (Cri) 224]. Learned counsel submitted that the ratio laid down in the judgment of the learned Single Judge is identical and direct. The learned JMFC has rightly distinguished the case of the “InderjitSingh Grewal” (supra) and has considered the Bombay High Court judgment in proper prospective. Learned counsel submitted that the learned Sessions Judge ought to have relied on the judgment of the Bombay High Court and also the provisions of the D.V. Act. He took me to the various provisions under the D.V. Act, specially to the defining clauses under sections 2 and 3 of the Act.
6. Per Contra, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent husband submitted that the order passed by the Sessions Judge is correct and should be maintained. Learned counsel submitted that the ratio laid down in
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