Vicarious liability under the Motor Vehicles Act is determined based on whether the negligent act of the employee falls within the scope of employment, as established by the authorized and lawful initial act.

Sunil Balkrishna Shukre, J.

1. This appeal is preferred against the judgment and award delivered on 11th January, 2002, in Claim Petition No. 347 of 1993 by the Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Nagpur. The respondent No. 1 is the original claimant. He had filed a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 claiming compensation for the loss occasioned by him owing to his sustaining of serious injuries leading to his suffering from a permanent disability, in the accident caused by rash and negligent driving of one water tanker truck bearing registration No. MTF-7022. At the time of accident, this truck was being driven by respondent No. 2, who was in the employment of appellants, and the truck was insured with the respondent No. 3. The accident occurred at about 7.00 p.m. on 6.2.1993 near Ajani over bridge. In that accident, the said vehicle gave a dash to the bicycle rode by respondent No. 1 and one Bahoran Singh. While respondent No. 1, who was a labourer, suffered grievous injuries which led to suffering of permanent disability by him, Bahoran Singh died. The petition that was filed against both the appellants and respondent Nos. 2 and 3, claimed compensation of Rs. 1,20,000/- jointly and severally from them. The petition was partly allowed and the compensation of Rs. 52,000/- was awarded to the respondent No. 1 by the Tribunal by its judgment and award delivered on 11.1.2002.

2. According to the appellants, who were the employers of respondent No. 2, as the accident occurred due to an act beyond the scope of employment of respondent No. 2, no liability for compensation could have been fastened upon them. Therefore, they have preferred the present appeal against the said judgment and award.

3. I have heard Mr. M.A. Kadu, learned A.G.P. for the appellants and Mr. Y.R. Sonkusre, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1. The respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are absent though duly served.

4. With the assistance of learned A.G.P. and learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, I have carefully gone through the impugned judgment and award and the record of the Tribunal. Now, the only point which arises for my determination is:

Whether the appellants were vicariously liable to pay compensation for the negligent act of respondent No. 2?

5. Learned A.G.P. for the appellants has taken me through the evidence adduced by the parties and submitted that this is a case in which the present appellants could not have been even remotely held as vicariously liable for the negligent act of respondent No. 2. He submits that the respondent No. 2 was directed to take offending truck to a workshop at Pipri, district Wardha, from Taroda, district Wardha, in the afternoon of 5th February, 1993 and respondent No. 2, exceeding his authority, took the vehicle to Nagpur, in another direction and caused the accident on 6th February, 1993. He submits that the respondent No. 2 was never authorized to take the vehicle to Nagpur and, therefore, the accident which occurred in this case fell out of the scope of employment and as such these appellants could not have been held to be responsible vicariously for the negligent act of respondent No. 2.

6. Mr. Sonkusre, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra and others vs. Kanchanmala Vijaysing Shirke and others, reported in AIR 1995 SC 2499, which is the case also followed by the Tribunal, and submitted that once the evidence established that initial act fell within the scope of employment of the driver, the subsequent act, may be unauthorised in a way, would also have to be considered as connected with the performance of the duty and within the scope of the employment and, therefore, the appellants have been rightly held to be vicariously liable for the damage in the nature of loss arising from suffering of grievous injuries of respondent No. 1. He, therefore, submits that the appeal deserves to be dismisse