Heard finally by consent.

2. Admit.

3. This revision application is directed against the order dated 30.9.2013 passed by the Principal District Judge, Wardha in MARJE No.86/20 12 thereby condoning the delay occurred in filing of appeal against the judgment and decree passed in Special Civil Suit No. 104/2002 on 12th March, 2008.

4. Learned counsel for the applicants submits that no sufficient cause has been shown in this case by the respondents inasmuch as it is an admitted position that the respondents approached the Advocate on 9th July, 2008, well after expiry of period of 90 days prescribed for filing of an appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the Court exercising original jurisdiction. He submits that sufficient cause must have shown to have arisen before the expiry of the limitation period and thereafter also it should have been established by the respondents and this is not a case in the instant matter. He submits that entire blame for the delay has been placed upon the Advocate, as if the litigant has no duty to exercise diligence in prosecuting remedy available to him under the law. Therefore, the entire approach adopted by the Appellate Court in accepting the negligence of the Advocate as sufficient cause is inconsistent with well settled principles of law. In support, he places his reliance upon the cases of Mr. Conception Fernandes and another Vs. Mrs. Tasneem Shaikh and others, reported in 2014(5) ALL MR 751 and Chandrakant s/o. Laxman Kulbhaiyya and another Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, reported in 2014(5) ALL MR 609.

5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 submits that sufficient cause has been shown by the respondents in the sense that while the respondents performed their duty, their Advocate failed to perform it and, therefore, at least no mala fides were attributable to the respondents. He submits that the concept of negligence takes within its fold the idea of some positive action and, therefore, it is opposed to a mistake occurred inadvertently. He submits that if there is some deliberate inaction or mala fides on the part of the person seeking indulgence of the Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, same would not amount to establishing sufficient cause and, therefore not pardonable. But, he further submits, in this case, no mala fides would be attributed to the respondents and, therefore, the learned Principal District Judge has rightly allowed the application for condonation of delay.

6. Before dealing with the rival argument, it is necessary to remind ourselves that this is a revision application in which the scope and ambit of the power of this Court to revise the order of the lower Court are limited and they are confined only to correction of errors relating to exercise or non-exercise of jurisdiction or some illegality or material irregularity affecting prejudicially rights of parties. In exercise of the revisional powers it is not permissible for the Court to go into the findings of fact recorded by the lower Court.

Bearing in mind, these limitations, let us consider the rival arguments in the light of the facts and circumstances of the present case as set out in the paper book of the revision application.

7. As regards first contention that sufficient cause ought to have been shown to have arisen before the expiry of limitation period, I must say that there is averment in the application itself that the respondents had approached the concerned Advocate in June 2008 and this has been appropriately considered by the lower Court. I see no reason to make any interference in the finding recorded by the lower Court in this behalf. Therefore, the first contention so raised deserves rejection.

8. In the case of Chandrakant (supra), learned Single Judge of this Court has found that the party must satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or application and that sufficient cause arose within the prescribed period of limita