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2015 Supreme(Bom) 486

High Court of Judicature at Bombay
ROSHAN DALVI, J.
Ramesh W. Sawant & Another – Appellant
Versus
Apex Urban Co-op. Bank of Maharashtra & Goa Ltd. & Others – Respondent
Notice of Motion No. 1136 of 2014 in Suit No. 2457 of 2001
Decided On : 01-04-2015

Advocate Appeared:
For the Plaintiff:Vaibhav Joglekar a/w. Ashish Rao, Nikhil Jangid i/b. M & M Legal Venture, Advocates.
For the Defendant:D1, Karan Bhosale a/w. R.P. Gurjar i/b. M.V. Kini & Co., Advocates.

The central legal point established in the judgment is that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is determined by the nature of the suit and the specific reliefs sought, which must fall under the categories for which the Civil Court's jurisdiction would be barred under the relevant acts.

Headnote:

Jurisdiction - Maharashtra Rent Control Act - Section 9A - The court's inherent jurisdiction is not barred - Acts and sections referenced: Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, Section 9A; Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, Section 41 - The court's decision was influenced by the interpretation of the nature of the suit and the specific reliefs sought by the plaintiff, which determined the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.

Fact of the Case:

The plaintiff sued for a declaration that two leave and license agreements were valid and binding, and for payment of license fees and damages. The defendant argued that the Civil Court's jurisdiction was barred under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act and the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not barred as the suit was for declarations and damages, not for recovery of rent or possession.

Issues: The main issue was whether the court's inherent jurisdiction was barred under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act and the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act.

Ratio Decidendi: The court's jurisdiction was determined based on the nature of the suit and the specific reliefs sought by the plaintiff, which did not fall under the categories for which the Civil Court's jurisdiction would be barred.

Final Decision: The court held that its jurisdiction was not barred and allowed the suit to proceed.

Judgment :-

1. The preliminary issue with regard to the jurisdiction of this Court is raised under Section 9A of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. The issue is framed and answered as follows:

Whether this Court’s inherent jurisdiction is barred. - No

2. The plaintiff has sued for a declaration that two agreements dated 30th May, 1996 which are leave and license agreements for a period of 5 years up to 29th May, 2009 are valid, subsisting and binding on the parties and for a declaration that defendant No.1 has never terminated or repudiated the said two agreements dated 30th May, 1996 and also for payment of Rs.1.87 crores as per particulars of claim, Exhibit-Q to the plaint or in the alternative Rs.27.42 lakhs as per particulars of the claim, Exhibit-R to the plaint and for an injunction against defendant No.2 from suing or claiming any amount from the DRT under an MOU dated 10th July, 1996(which prayer has become infructuous as the plaintiff and defendant No.2 have settled their disputes).

3. The dispute is between plaintiff and defendant No.1. Under the aforesaid agreement dated 30th May 1996 the plaintiff as the licensor licensed the suit premises to defendant No.1 as the licensee. The agreement was to be subsisting between the parties for a period of 3 years from 1st June 1996 to 31st May 1999 under clause 3 of the agreement subject to any renewal / extension provided therein. It was to be renewed for a further period of 2 years under clause 5 of the agreement.

4. For the payment of the license fee to the plaintiff / licensor the parties entered into a further arrangement under which the payment was to be made by the defendant No.1 in the account of the plaintiff with defendant No.2 from whom a loan was taken by the plaintiff. This loan was to be recovered within a period of 5 years by defendant No.2 bank. The parties entered into the MOU dated 19th July, 1996, Exhibit-D to the plaint under which the plaintiff as the borrower obtained the loan from defendant No.2 as the landlord.

5. Defendant No.1 confirmed the MOU, Exhibit-D to the plaint and agreed that until the loan was repaid in full by the borrower to the landlord, the plaintiff as the borrower would not terminate the leave and license agreement with defendant No.1. Since the loan was to be repaid in 5 years time, the plaintiff would claim that the parties to the MOU including defendant No.1 agreed that the leave and license agreement would subsist for 5 years when the loan would be repaid.

6. Yet in clause 7 of the MOU the parties agreed that if for any breach committed by the defendant No.1, the agreement was terminated prior to the extended period (it would be by the plaintiff as the licensor) the plaintiff would make full payment of the loan to defendant No.2. Such prior termination was allowed only to the plaintiff. The obligation under clause 7 was only of the plaintiff. It has nothing to do with defendant No.1 or the agreement of the plaintiff with defendant No.1.

7. Defendant No.1 has not terminated the agreement. Defendant No.1 could not terminate the agreement. Defendant No.1 has, however, handed over vacant possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff prior to even the initial period of 3 years of the initial agreement of license dated 30th May 1996. The possession is stated to have been handed over on 26th or 28th February, 1999.

8. The plaintiff would claim that by such handing over of possession and the consequent implied termination, the plaintiff has lost the license fee which was agreed to be paid by defendant No.1 to the plaintiff for the remainder of the period of license. The plaintiff could not license the premises to any other parties soon thereafter. The plaintiff suffered loss and damages of such license fee and consequent interest thereon. The plaintiff has sought to mitigate those damages by licensing the premises, albeit at a lesser rate, to another party, on a later date. The premises is said to be licensed to one Stock Holder Corporatio


















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