The main legal point established in the judgment is the distinction between a development agreement and an agreement of sale, and the considerations for granting interim relief in cases seeking specific performance.

1. This appeal filed by the original plaintiff takes exception to the order passed by the trial Court refusing to grant any interim injunction in favour of the appellant during pendency of the suit.

2. It is the case of the appellant – plaintiff that on 26-11-2007, an agreement was entered into with the predecessor of the respondents original defendant. As per said agreement, the parties agreed that the work of developing the property in question which was an open plot for the purposes of constructing an apartment scheme should be undertaken by the appellant subject to various terms and conditions. According to the appellant, it was permitted to develop said property subject to the original defendant paying a sum of Rs.531 per square foot as consideration. Initially, an amount of Rs.3,00,000/- was paid to the original defendant. The balance amounts were to be paid in the manner prescribed in the agreement. According to the appellant, on 18-3-2011, a notice came to be issued to the original defendant calling upon said defendant to take all necessary steps in terms of said agreement so as to complete the contract. Thereafter, on 4-5-2012 an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- came to be paid to the original defendant and on 5-5-2012, the appellant received possession of the suit property. Thereafter on 17-7-2012 another notice came to be issued to the original defendant to complete the transaction in question. However, as no steps were taken by the original defendant and subsequently by his legal heirs, suit for specific performance of agreement dated 26-11-2007 came to be filed in March, 2013.

3. The legal heirs of the original defendant filed their written statement in which it was stated that the agreement between the parties was only for developing the property and not for selling the same. It was denied that possession was handed over to the appellant on 5-5-2012. It was also stated that the payment of Rs.2,00,000/- was made by the appellant on 29-4-2012 only for the purposes of bringing the suit within limitation. On these grounds, the suit came to be opposed.

4. During pendency of the said suit, the appellant moved an application below Exhibit-5 praying that the appellant was always ready and willing to perform its part of the agreement and that the respondents were not interested in completing the transaction. It was, therefore, prayed that during pendency of the suit, the respondents be restrained from disturbing the possession of the appellant and also that no third party rights be created in the suit property. This application was opposed by the respondents on the same stand that was taken in the written statement.

5. The trial Court after considering the material available on record held that the agreement dated 26-11-2007 was not a registered agreement nor was it sufficiently stamped and, therefore, no right was created in the appellant. It also recorded a finding that the appellant could not show that it had been placed in possession. For aforesaid reasons, the trial Court rejected the application for temporary injunction. 6. Shri R. R. Srivastava, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the trial Court misdirected itself in holding that as the agreement was unregistered and insufficiently stamped, the same could not be acted upon. Relying upon judgment of learned Single Judge in Marine Container Services (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajesh Dhirajlal Vora 2001(4) Mh.L.J. 353, it was submitted that the aspect regarding non-registration of the document and it being insufficiently stamped did not carry much weightage when an application for temporary injunction was being considered. He then submitted that merely because the document was titled as a development agreement, the same will not disentitle the appellant for the relief of specific performance. He relied upon the provisions of Section 14(3) (c) of the Specific Relief Act 1963 (for short the said Act) to urge that the appellant was entitled to seek speci