Subsequent events, such as vacating the staff quarters, must be considered at the time of hearing the petition and while deciding the validity of the eviction decree based on the ground of acquisition of alternative accommodation.

1. By this petition, the Petitioner challenges Judgment and Decree dated 11 November 1997 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Kolhapur and the Judgment and order by the Additional District Judge, Kolhapur dated 13 July 1999, decreeing the suit and dismissing the appeal. By the impugned orders Petitioners-tenants are directed to be evicted from the suit premises.

2. The father of the Petitioner No.1 was the original tenant of the suit premises and upon his death, the Petitioner No.1 who was residing in the premises became the tenant. After her marriage, Petitioner No.2, her husband also came to reside in the suit premises. The Respondents filed a suit bearing No.900 of 1986 for recovery of the suit premises from the Petitioners. The suit premises are one room, admeasuring 15 ft. x 10 ft. in C.S.No.2230/C, Somwar Peth, C Ward, Kolhapur. The possession was sought on the ground of bonafide requirement of the Respondents and the Petitioners being in arrears of rent. The Respondents amended the plaint and pleaded that the Petitioners had acquired suitable alternate accommodation on 5 May 1991, a service quarter provided by State Transport Corporation at Kolhapur. The Petitioners filed their Written statement and denied the contentions. The Petitioners denied that they were defaulters and that premises were required for personal and bonafide use of the Respondents.

3. The learned Civil Judge heard the suit and application for fixation of standard rent. The learned Civil Judge negatived the ground of bonafide requirement, but passed a decree on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent and acquisition of alternative accommodation. Thereafter the Petitioners filed a Regular Civil Appeal No.591 of 1997 in the District Court at Kolhapur. The District Court negatived the case of the Respondent on the ground of default however, confirmed the decree on the ground of acquisition of alternative accommodation and accordingly dismissed the appeal by order dated 13 July 1991. Thereafter the present petition is filed.

4. I have heard Mr. S.M. Kamble, learned counsel for the Petitioners and Mr. Manoj Patil, learned counsel for the Respondents.

5. It is placed on record by the Petitioners that the Petitioner No.2 had surrendered accommodation on 18 May 1992 and thereafter services of the Petitioner No.2 were terminated on 3 March 1999. The position has not been controverted. The tenant of the premises is Petitioner No.1 and it was Petitioner No.2her husband, was allotted the staff quarters.

6. The issue of alternate accommodation was discussed by the learned District Judge. The learned District Judge noted the contention that the Petitioner No.2 was removed from services on medical ground being unfit. Thereafter the learned District Judge recorded a finding that the alternative accommodation admittedly was available from 5 January 1991 to 18 May 1992. The learned District Judge found this acquisition as enough to attract the provisions of Section 13(1)(l) of the Bombay Rent Act. The learned District Judge, did not find it necessary to inquire further as to whether, subsequently in view of the ceasation of services, the service quarters were available. When the appeal was argued before the learned District Judge, the assertion of the Petitioners that service quarters were no longer available went uncontroverted. The learned District Judge went by the version of the witness examined by the Respondents from the State Transport Department that alternative accommodation in terms of staff quarters was available for a period of one and a half year, and the learned District Judge found that it is enough to sustain the decree of eviction.

7. Thus, the position that emerges is that when the appeal was heard by the learned District Judge, the Petitioners were no longer in possession of the service quarters and the Petitioner No.2 was discharged from services. Therefore, the question is whether the Appellate Court should have consid