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2016 Supreme(Bom) 331

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
A.B. CHAUDHARI, J.
Smt. C. Padmawati Naidu & Ors. - Appellants
Versus
Friends Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. & Ors. - Respondents
Second Appeal No. 235/2012
Decided on : 4-3-2016

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
Mr. V.V. Bhangde, for the appellants
Mr. K.H. Deshpande, Mr. S.M. Patrikar, Akshay Sudame, for respondent no.1
Mrs. Geeta Tiwari AGP for respondent no.3

Important Point – Point of commencement of limitation do not get automatically suspended because of coming into force of any special law.

Headnote:Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 20 – Limitation Act, 1963 – Article 54 – Specific performance of contract – Provisions of Limitation Act or point of commencement of limitation do not get automatically suspended because of coming into force of any special law – Second Part of Article 54 would have application in that explicit refusal or cancellation of agreement by Exhibit would be a notice or the point or rather a starting point for commencement of limitation – Once limitation started from point of refusal on part of vendor, it would stop only on date of filing of suit.

       Result – Second Appeal allowed.

JUDGMENT :

1. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 04.10.2011 in Civil Appeal No. 307/1999 passed by the learned District Judge-9, Nagpur, arising out of the judgment and decree dated 21.04.1999 in Special Civil Suit No. 564/1985 passed by 4th Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nagpur, the present Second Appeal has been preferred by the original defendants.

2. The Appeal has been taken up for final hearing as almost all the appellants are senior citizens and the litigation commenced in the year 1985, on the motion made by the counsel for the parties.

3. The respondent no.1/plaintiff brought a suit for specific performance of contract and for possession, stating that an agreement was executed for the purchase of the suit property by the plaintiff on 30.1.1975 for a consideration of Rs. 25,000/- per acre and on the date of agreement by way of earnest, an amount of Rs. 6,000/- was paid. The sale deed was to be executed within a period of two years i.e. on or before 30.1.1977. The plaintiff was ready and willing to obtain the sale deed but, in the interregnum, with effect from 17.2.1976, the Urban Land Ceiling Regulation Act, 1976 was brought into force and the suit property was specified for residential use in the Master Plan and, as such, upon application on the Urban Land Ceiling Act, all transactions of transfer were prohibited, save and except the exemption to be obtained u/s. 20 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act. The exemption u/s 20 would be obtained by the landlord or the vendor and the prohibition operated as the legal impediment for completion of sale deed. The plaintiff had by letter dated 15.04.1976 intimated the defendant that the plaintiff was willing to complete the transfer as per the agreed terms, provided the land is released from the Ceiling Act. In fact, the Application for exemption was made by the defendant on 13.08.1976 and an additional Application on 05.02.1980 was also filed and a joint application was signed by both the plaintiff as well as the defendant, with reference to the agreement dated 30.1.1975. The plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract pursuant to which both of them had jointly and individually applied for exemption. However on 12.7.1982, to the utter dismay and surprise of the plaintiff, the defendant informed that the agreement dated 30.1.1975 should be treated as a cancelled as the defendant did not hear anything from the plaintiff for a long time. The communication of cancellation was duly replied on 3.8.1982 informing the defendant that the plaintiff-society was and is ready and willing to perform the part of the contract but for the fact that the proceedings for exemption were pending with the Government the sale deed could not be completed and hence defendant should not cancel the contract. It was also stated that there was no unilateral right reserved in favour of the defendant to cancel the agreement and, therefore, the action of cancellation was void ab initio. It is then contended in the suit that the pending application for exemption was ultimately decided by an order dated 31.12.1984 by which the State Government granted exemption, which clearly furthered the case of the plaintiff, about readiness and willingness and as per the terms and conditions of the exemption order, within a period of one year the transaction was to be completed. It was then stated in the plaint that the plaintiff was under a bona fide belief that it was not necessary to have permission under Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha) Region Act, since the suit was included in the Urban Agglomeration. Having realised that it was necessary, the plaintiff informed the defendant vide notice dated 4.3.1985 that a joint application was required to be filed under Section 89 of the BT & AL Act to the Sub-Divisional Officer. Finally, the SDO on 10.12.1985 granted permissio

















































































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