The central legal point established in the judgment is that a Physical Training Instructor, being a teacher as defined under section 2 (26) of the Act of 1977, cannot be considered a workman as defined by provisions of section 2 (s) of the Act of 1947, and thus, the Labour Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the claim.

The short issue has arises for consideration is whether a Physical Training Instructor can invoke jurisdiction of the Labour Court under the provisions of section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short the Act of 1947) for claiming difference of wages for the period prior to termination.

2. The relevant facts are that the respondent No. 1 claims to have been appointed as a Physical Training Instructor in view of his qualification of M.A., M.Com., B.P. Ed. According to him, he worked in the petitioner No. 2-Institution for the period from 1-7-1987 till 5-3-1992. According to him, he was entitled to be paid salary as well as bonus on fixed scale but however, he was initially paid an amount of Rs. 400/- per month and thereafter at the rate of Rs. 600/- per month from 1-7-1988. Hence, for recovering the amounts not paid, the respondent No. 1 filed proceedings under section 33-C (2) of the Act of 1947.

3. The petitioners in their reply raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. According to them, the respondent No. 1 was not a "workman" in terms of provisions of section 2 (s) of the Act of 1947 and hence, there was no jurisdiction with the Labour Court to adjudicate the claim.

4. The Labour Court while deciding the preliminary issue as to jurisdiction held that the respondent No. 1 was a workman as the witness of the petitioners had admitted that he was not a teacher. It further held that such claim for difference of wages could not be made by invoking provisions of section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (for short the Act of 1977). It therefore, held that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to entertain the claim. This order has been challenged by the petitioners herein.

5. Shri S. W. Sambre, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim made by the respondent No. 1 as he was a "teacher" within the meaning of said expression as defined by section 2 (26) of the Act of 1977. According to him, a Physical Training Instructor could not be called a workman for invoking provisions of the Act of 1947. He referred to various provisions of the Act of 1977 and also relied upon the following judgments (i) (2001) 5 SCC 338, State of W. B. and others vs. Harendra Nath Bhowmick and others; (ii) AIR 1975 SC 2238, Premier Automobiles Ltd. vs. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke and others; (iii) AIR 1967 M. P. 177 (V 54 C 55), M. P. Sharma vs. Industrial Court, M. P. Indore and others; and (iv) 1996 (II) CLR 691 Narendra Dev vs. Labour Court, Bikaner and anr. He also relied upon the dictionary meaning of the expression "teacher" and submitted that an Instructor was also a teacher.

6. On the other hand Smt. S. W. Deshpande, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 supported the order of the Labour Court. According to her, as the witness of the petitioners had admitted that respondent No. 1 was not teaching in the Institution, he was a workman. She submitted that claim for unpaid salary prior to termination could not have been made before the School Tribunal in terms of judgment of the learned Single Judge in 1995 (1) Mh.L.J. 847, Sangam Education Society, Nagpur and anr. vs. Bharti Hansraj Borkar and anr. Reliance was also placed on the judgment in the case of Shivshakti Shikshan Sanstha and another vs. Nilkanth s/o Kawaduji Shivshankar and another, 2005 (3) Mh.L.J 696 to urge that a Physical Training Instructor could not be treated to be an Assistant Teacher. She then submitted by relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Premier Automobiles (supra) that it was the choice of the suitor to choose his remedy and hence, jurisdiction of the Labour Court had been invoked.

7. Shri M. A. Kadu, the learned AGP appeared for respondent No. 2.

8. I have considered the respective submissions and I have gone through the relevant material relied by the parties. While considering the aspect o