The duty to interpret the law to promote substantial justice, including the obligation to provide for the educational needs of the son, even after attaining majority.

1. The challenge in this petition is to the order dated 21 January 2016 made by the Family Court, Mumbai enhancing the amount of maintenance payable to the respondent-wife under the provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (said Act).

2. In the year 2005, respondent No.2 wife of the petitioner instituted a petition for maintenance and other reliefs invoking the provisions of Sections 18 and 20 of the said Act. The Family Court, by order dated 27 June 2008, disposed of the petition by inter alia, directing the petitioner to pay maintenance at the rate of Rs.800/- per month to the wife and Rs.700/- per month to Atul, son of the petitioner, who was at that time a minor.

3. By further order dated 22 April 2013, the Family Court for cogent reasons enhanced the amount of maintenance to Rs.3000/- per month to the wife and directed lumpsum payment of Rs.20,000/- per year towards educational expenses of the son Atul, who, even at that stage, was a minor.

4. The respondent-wife, by further application dated 13 March 2015 applied to the Family Court for further enhancement in the amount of maintenance. By impugned order dated 21 January 2016, the Family Court has enhanced the maintenance amount payable to the respondent-wife at the rate of Rs.8000/- per month. Aggrieved, the petitioner has instituted the present petition.

5. Mr. Gamare, learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that since the maintenance amount had been enhanced, on previous two occasions, there was neither any jurisdiction nor any case made out for grant of any further enhancement in the amount of maintenance. Mr. Gamare submitted that the Family Court has acknowledged that no maintenance can be awarded in favour of son Atul, since, by now, he has already attained the age of majority. However, the Family Court, by taking into consideration the educational needs of Atul, has enhanced the maintenance payable to the respondent-wife and thereby achieved indirectly what the law prohibits directly. Mr. Gamare also submitted that the petitioner earns salary of hardly Rs.15,000/- per month and therefore, direction for payment of maintenance at the enhanced rate of Rs.8000/- per month, in such facts and circumstances is excessive and disproportionate. For all these reasons, Mr. Gamare submits that the impugned order warrants interference in the exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution of India.

6. The contention based upon lack of jurisdiction to entertain successive applications for enhancement of maintenance amount has no merit. There is no provision under the said Act which bars the entertainment of applications for variation of the maintenance amount on more than one occasions, as long as change of circumstances is pleaded and eventually made good. The orders relating to maintenance, by their very nature, are variable. Therefore, as long as the party seeking variation is in a position to plead and prove change in circumstances, there can be no legal bar to the institution of applications seeking variation in the maintenance amount.

7. This is not a case where the enhanced maintenance is either excessive or disproportionate. The Family Court, upon assessment of the material on record, which comprises oral as well as documentary evidence, has enhanced the maintenance amount. The Family Court has adverted to the correct parameters applicable to such matters. In proceedings for judicial review such as this one, this court is not expected to reevaluate or reassess the material on record, as if it were exercising any appellate jurisdiction. The findings of fact recorded by the Family Court neither suffer from any perversity nor is this a case where any irrelevant or extraneous material has crept into the decision making process. In such circumstances, there is no case made out to interfere with the quantum of maintenance.

8. However, since the learned counsel for the petitioner seriously contended that there is no material o