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2016 Supreme(Bom) 1401

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD
P.R. BORA, J.
Vilas Trimbak Sanap - APPELLANT
VERSUS
Shriram Rajendera Sanap - RESPONDENTS
APPEAL FROM ORDER NO.30 OF 2016 WITH CIVIL APPLICATION NO.6171/2016
Decided On : 20-10-2016

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellant :Mr. Satyajit S. Bora, Advocate.
For the Respondent: Mr. K.U. More, Adv.

The genuineness and lawfulness of a compromise should be scrutinized before passing a consent decree, and a decree termed as a consent decree may not necessarily operate as a bar for filing an appeal by a third party.

Headnote:

Consent Decree - Partition - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (C.P.C.) - Section 96(3), Order 23 Rule 3, Order 43 Rule 1 - The court discussed the provisions of Section 96(3) of C.P.C. and the legal principles established in the cases of Daljit Kaur vs. Muktar Steels Pvt. Ltd. and Pushpa Devi Bhagat vs. Rajinder Singh. The court found that the decree obtained by the Trial Court was not a consent decree but a collusive decree, and therefore, the bar under Section 96(3) of C.P.C. did not apply. The court also highlighted the importance of scrutinizing the genuineness and lawfulness of a compromise before passing a consent decree.

Fact of the Case:

The appellant filed a civil suit for partition against his father and brothers. A compromise was reached, and the suit was decreed. Subsequently, non-party respondents filed an appeal challenging the decree, claiming their share in the suit properties. The first appellate court allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to the trial court for deciding it afresh with a direction to implead the non-party respondents as parties to the suit. The appellant appealed against this decision.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the decree obtained by the Trial Court was not a consent decree but a collusive decree. It held that the bar under Section 96(3) of C.P.C. did not apply, and the non-party respondents had the right to challenge the decree by filing an appeal. The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision of the first appellate court.

Issues: 1. Whether the appeal filed by non-party respondents was maintainable? 2. Whether the decree passed by the Trial Court can be held to be a consent decree? 3. Whether the impugned judgment is sustainable?

Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized the need to scrutinize the genuineness and lawfulness of a compromise before passing a consent decree. It held that a decree termed as a consent decree may not necessarily operate as a bar for filing an appeal by a third party, and the circumstances leading to the compromise should be examined to determine its genuineness and lawfulness.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal, upheld the decision of the first appellate court, and allowed the non-party respondents to challenge the decree by filing an appeal. It also directed the trial court to implead the non-party respondents as parties to the suit and decide the matter afresh.

JUDGMENT :

1. Heard. The appellant has filed the present appeal against Judgment and Order dated 12th January, 2016 passed by District Judge1, Beed in Regular Civil Appeal No.50/2015.

2. The appellant had filed Regular Civil Suit No.499/2014 for partition against his father and brothers claiming his 1/4th share alleging that father and brothers had refused to give him his share in the suit properties. In the aforesaid suit, compromise took place between the parties and on the basis of the said compromise-deed, the aforesaid civil suit came to be decreed by the learned trial court.

3. Present Respondent Nos. 1 to 3, who were not party to the aforesaid suit, filed Regular Civil Appeal No. 50/2015 assailing the Judgment and Decree dated 29th December, 2014 passed by the Trial court. It was the contention of these respondents that along with the plaintiff and defendants in the subject suit, they also possess share in the suit properties and as such without there presence in the said suit, impugned decree could not have been passed merely on consent of the plaintiff and defendants therein.

The appellant appeared in the appeal filed by Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and resisted the same. The appellant denied the claim of the respondents that they have share in the suit properties and also objected to filing of the appeal by Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 on the ground of its maintainability. It was the contention of the present appellant before the first appellate court that the decree passed by the trial court on 29th December, 2014 being a consent decree, Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 herein, were not having any right to challenge the said decree by filing an appeal in view of the specific bar provided under Section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, C.P.C.). The learned first appellate court, however, vide the impugned judgment, allowed the Regular Civil Appeal No.50/2015 and thereby remanded the matter to the trial court for deciding it afresh with a further direction to implead present Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 as parties to the suit. Aggrieved by, the original plaintiff has filed the present appeal.

4. Shri Satyajeet Bora, The learned Counsel for appellant has assailed the impugned Judgment and Order mainly on the ground that the first appellate court failed in appreciating that the decree, which was challenged before it, was a consent decree, and as such, could not have been challenged by a third party in view of the specific bar provided under Section 96(3) of the C.P.C. In support of the contention so raised, learned Counsel relied upon two judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court, first in the case of Daljit Kaur and Anr. Vs. Muktar Steels Pvt. Ltd. and Ors., ( 2013) 16 SCC 607 and another in the case of Pushpa Devi Bhagat (dead) through L.r. Smt. Sadhana Rai Vs. Rajinder Singh and Ors., AIR 2006 SC 2628.

5. Shri K.U. More, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, supported the impugned Judgment and Order. The learned Counsel submitted that Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 do have their share in the suit properties. The learned Counsel further submitted that Govind Genu Sanap was the original ancestor, who had two sons, viz.–Tulshiram Trimbak and three daughters. The learned Counsel further submitted that Tulshiram had a son viz. Rajendra, who was husband of present Respondent No.3 and father of Respondent Nos. 1 & 2. The learned Counsel further submitted that Govind Genu Sanap and one Hari had purchased the suit properties from one Chandulal Kankriya vide registered sale deed executed on 24th September, 1958 and after death of Govind, name of his sons were recorded in the revenue record to the extent of Govind’s share.

The learned Counsel further submitted that Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 being the legal heirs of Tulshiram, after death of their father, their names were recorded in the revenue records vide mutation entry No. 741 dated 13th January, 2006. The learned Counsel further submitted that after death of Rajendra, names of sons of deceased R





















































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