Back
2016 Supreme(Bom) 1268
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD
RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.
Yogeshwari Shikshan Sanstha, Through its Secretary - Petitioners
Versus
Sujata Prakash Ansarwadkar - Respondents
W.P. No. 6925 of 2016
Decided On : 27-09-2016
Advocate Appeared:
For the Petitioners:Shri Milind M. Patil (Beedkar) Advocate
For the Respondent:Shri D.R. Jethliya, Advocate, Shri P.N. Kutti, AGP
Headnote:Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 - Sections 2(7) and 9-Termination of employee.-Appeal before School Tribunal by widow of deceased terminated employee, challenging his stigmatic termination is maintainable.
Under the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act. Section 2(7) defining "an employee" will ordinarily mean "an employee". However, if the present context in which the definition is to be applied, it would require a somewhat different interpretation. The said definition will have to be understood in a sense which would give a broader meaning to the term `employee`.
The intent and object of the Act should not be defeated by interpreting the definition of `employee` in a constricted manner. If a legal heir/widow can step into the shoes of a deceased husband, who has instituted the appeal, on the basis of being a successor-in-interest, such a widow could then also institute such an appeal when the deceased husband is not available for assailing the order of dismissal.
In the present case, the employee has passed away within the limitation period, the successor-in-interest could pose a challenge to the purported injustice caused to him. The consequences of the dismissal of the deceased employee, would surely affect his widow and his family. The entire family would suffer the consequences of his dismissal, which especially, would cause grave financial losses to his family, besides ignominy. When the rights of his widow and minor children are affected, it would certainly be unjust to conclude that his widow cannot assail his dismissal. Considering the provisions of Section 11(2) and the intent and object of the Act and the unforeseen circumstances, the widow of the employee could not be precluded from posing a challenge to the stigmatic termination of her husband, who is not alive to take up the challenge. The impugned order of the Tribunal, therefore, cannot be branded as being perverse or erroneous. 2016(2) Mh LJ (FB) 677 and 1995 (2) SLR 335, Ref.
1. Heard the learned Advocates for the respective parties.
2. Rule.
3. By consent, Rule is made returnable forthwith and the petition is taken up for final disposal.
4. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order dated 15.1.2016 delivered by the School Tribunal, Aurangabad, by which, the application preferred by the petitioners contending that Appeal No.20 of 2014 filed by respondent No.1 - widow is not maintainable, has been rejected and the appeal has been held to be maintainable under Section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (“the MEPS Act” for short).
5. The issue raised by the petitioners in this petition is as to "Whether the widow of an employee can lodge an Appeal under Section 9 of the MEPS Act before the School Tribunal on the ground that the employee himself is not alive to challenge his removal from service?"
6. The contentions of Shri Patil, learned Advocate for the petitioners can be summarized as under:-
(a) Prakash Ansarwadkar was the employee of the petitioner.
(b) He had put in 18 years in service.
(c) A departmental enquiry was conducted as per Rules 36 and 37 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981 (“MEPS Rules” for short) and upon him finding guilty, he was dismissed from service.
(d) He was terminated by the management on 12.10.2009.
(e) On 28.10.2009, the said employee committed suicide and is said to have blamed the management for his miseries.
(f) Respondent No.1 widow of the employee has filed Appeal No.20 of 2014.
(g) The prayers put forth by the widow indicate that the Tribunal is called upon to set aside the enquiry and the termination dated 12.10.2009.
(h) The petitioner filed it's written statement opposing the Appeal.
(i) An application was filed for objecting to the maintainability of the Appeal on the ground that the appellant (widow) is not an employee under Section 2(7) of the MEPS Act.
(j) The appeal filed by the appellant is not tenable under Section 9 of the MEPS Act.
(k) Since the appellant is not an employee, she could not have instituted the Appeal, as an employee alone can file such an appeal.
(l) Reliance is placed upon the following judgments:-
(i) B. Premanand Vs. Mohan Koikal and others [AIR 2011 SC 1925] and
(ii) St. Ulai High School and another Vs. Devendraprasad Jagannath Singh and others [2007 (1) Mh.L.J. 597].
7. Shri Patil has strenuously canvassed his submissions on the basis of the definition of 'employee' and the language used in Section 9 to contend that the employee alone could prefer an appeal. The word 'an employee' is specifically used in Section 9 and which is defined under Section 2(7), thereby indicating that the intent of the legislature is to exclude any person other than an employee, notwithstanding whether any other person is an 'aggrieved person'. He, therefore, submits that respondent No.1 appellant can, at the most, be termed as being an 'aggrieved person', but she cannot fall within the meaning of 'employee' under Section 2(7) read with Section 9.
8. He draws my attention to Section 9 of the MEPS Act and Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 to contend that under Section 19 "any aggrieved person" can file an Appeal or initiate proceedings, unlike Section 9, which does not permit any aggrieved person to lodge an appeal under the MEPS Act. He further submits that Section 11 of the MEPS Act provides for reliefs that could be granted only to an 'employee'. As such, the widow of the employee cannot be granted such reliefs.
9. He has then referred to paragraph No.9.2 of the judgment delivered by the learned Full Bench in St.Ulai case (supra), in support of his contention that the words, 'and who is aggrieved' have been considered and it has been held that these words do not create a separate head of challenge. Paragraph 9.2 reads as under:-
“9.2 One of the submissions urged before the Court is that in the group of words "and who is aggrieved", the "and" sho
