2017 Supreme(Bom) 205

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
PRAKASH D. NAIK, J.
The State of Maharashtra - Appellant
Versus
Suresh Vitthal Mule - Respondent
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 392 OF 1999
Decided On : 15-02-2017

Important Point: The fact that accused was merely driving a vehicle at a high speed cannot attract Section 279 of IPC. The fact that a vehicle is driven in speed or that a vehicle is not driven in speed, cannot by itself without judging the situation in which the driver had been placed, be a factor to determine the rashness or negligence. High speed may not, in each cash, is sufficient to hold that the driver is rash or negligent.

Headnote:Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 279, 337 and 338-Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Section 184-Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 378-Motor accident-Rash and negligent driving.-In instant case, acquittal of alleged accused was held to be justified that prosecution could not establish that the driver of offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rash and negligently at the time of accident and it was also clear the injured witnesses were sitting at platform or on ground at relevant time.

       Section 279 of Indian Penal Code relates to the offence of rash driving or riding on a public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person. Section 337 of Indian Penal Code speaks about offence of causing hurt to any person by doing an act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life or personal safety of others. Section 338 of Indian Penal Code relates to the offence of causing grievous hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life or personal safety of others. The prosecution has not succeeded in establishing these ingredients of being rashly or negligently which is the requirement to constitute the aforesaid offences. Similarly, offence under Section 184 of Motor Vehicles Act also relates to driving dangerously which has not been established by prosecution as the evidence suffers from serious infirmities. Section 279 of Indian Penal Code has two essential ingredients; (i) driving of vehicle and (ii) driving must be so rash or negligent as to endanger human life or likely to cause hurt or injury to any person. A certain aggravated degree of rash or negligent driving is contemplated in the said provision.

       A rash act is primarily an overhasty act and thus opposed to a deliberate act, but it also includes an act which though it may be said to be deliberate, is yet done without due deliberation and caution. In rashness, the criminality lies in running the risk of doing an act with recklessness or indifference to consequences. Criminal rashness is a dangerous act with the knowledge that it is so and that it may cause injury, but without intention to cause injury or knowledge that it will be probably caused. The fact that accused was merely driving a vehicle at a high speed cannot attract Section 279 of Indian Penal Code. The fact that a vehicle is driven in speed or that a vehicle is not driven in speed, cannot by itself without judging the situation in which the driver had been placed, be a factor to determine the rashness or negligence. High speed may not, in each cash, is sufficient to hold that the driver is rash or negligent.

       In fact, in the present case, it is not established that the driver was, in such a high speed, driving in reckless manner or that he was rash or negligent. Section 184 of Motor Vehicles Act which also relates to driving dangerously, makes it clear that the person has to drive a vehicle at a speed or manner which is not dangerous to public having regard to the circumstances including nature, condition and use of place where the vehicle is driven and the amount of traffic which actually is at the time or which might reasonably be accepted to be in place. Offences under Sections 337 and 338 of Indian Penal Code, as stated hereinabove, also refer to the act done rashly or negligently for which evidence is short to convict the respondent-accused.

       In view of the aforesaid circumstances, the appellant-State has not made out any case for setting aside the judgment and order of trial Court. The order of acquittal in the present case cannot be converted into conviction. The acquittal order is justifiable in the facts and circumstances of present case. Taking into consideration the nature of evidence lead by the prosecution, the order passed by the trial Court deserves to be confirmed.