Back
2017 Supreme(Bom) 949
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
B.R. GAVAI AND RIYAZ I. CHAGLA, JJ.
Euro School Education Trust - Petitioner
Versus
Divisional Fee Regulatory Committee, Pune & Ors. - Respondents
WRIT PETITION NO. 7594 OF 2017 and WRIT PETITION (L) NO. 471 OF 2017
Decided On : 18-07-2017.
For the Petitioner: Mr. Pravin Samdani, Amogh Singh, Arvind Kothari, Sahil Kanuga, Aarushi Jain, Siddharth Ratho, Arjun Gupta, Nishith Desai Associates
For the Respondent: Mr. C.P. Yadav, Mr. Siddharth Shankar Sharma
Headnote:Appeal -A statutory right of appeal.-Unless and until statutes specifically provides for appeal, there cannot be an inherent right to appeal.
Tribunal -Jurisdiction of Tribunal.-Tribunal created under statute having limited jurisdiction is required to decide issue as to whether it has jurisdiction to decide matter which is brought before it or not.
Interpretation of Statutes -Plain and literal construed.-When first principle of interpretation of statutes cannot give effect to legislative intent, only then recourse to other principles permissible.
Interpretation of Statutes -Principle of harmonious construction.-Court must take into consideration various provisions of statute and apply principle of harmonious construction.
Maharashtra Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fees) Act, 1987-Preamble-Object of.-Object of Act is to prevent commercialization of education through profiteering by Educational Institutions.
Maharashtra Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fees) Act, 1987 - Sections 4 and 7(1)-Jurisdiction of Divisional Fee Regulatory Committee.-Divisional Fees Regulatory Committee has limited jurisdiction to extent of determination of fees.
Maharashtra Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fees) Act, 1987 - Sections 6(5), 6(a) to (d)-Appeal.-A first appeal before Divisional Fees Regulatory Committee, can be filed only by Management.
B.R. Gavai, J.
1. Since the factual background and the questions of law that arise for consideration in the present matter are common, hence the same are heard together and decided by this common judgment and order.
2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith.
3. The core issue that is involved in the present Petition is as to whether individual parents have locus to approach the Divisional Fee Regulatory Committee (hereinafter referred to as “DFRC”) under the provisions of the Maharashtra Educational Institutes (Regulation of Fees) Act (hereinafter referred to as “said Act”.)
4. We have heard Shri Samdhani, learned Senior counsel and Shri Arvind G. Kothari, learned counsel for the Petitioners. Mr. C.P. Yadav for Respondent – State in Writ Petition No. 7594 of 2017 and Mr. Abhay Patki, AGP for State – Respondents Nos. 1, 3 and 4.
5. Shri Samdhani learned senior counsel submits that under the provisions of the said Act, it is only the management who is entitled to approach the DFRC. It is submitted that individual parents have no locus to file proceedings under the provisions of the said Act. Shri Samdhani learned senior counsel submits that the DFRC is the tribunal constituted under the provisions of said Act. It is submitted that a tribunal of a limited jurisdiction constituted under the provisions of a statute can exercise the powers only within the parameters as laid down by the statute. It is submitted that the tribunal cannot assume jurisdiction, which is not vested in it under the provisions of the statute. Shri Samdhani, therefore, submits that the impugned order which is passed by the DFRC in a proceeding initiated at the instance of the individual parents is not sustainable in law and the orders passed therein are liable to be quashed and set aside. Shri Samdhani further relying on the well settled principle laid down by the Privy Council in the case of Nazir Ahmad V. Kind-Emperor, which has been consistently followed submits that :
“when act is required to be done in particular manner, it shall be done in that manner or not at all”.
6. It is, therefore, submitted that the jurisdiction exercised by the DFRC has been exercised in a manner which is inconsistent with the provisions of the statute and, therefore, not sustainable in law.
7. Smt. Anubha Sahai and Shri Siddharth Sharma both submit that, the said Act is enacted with a benevolent object of curbing the malpractices of the management which indulge into profiteering. It is submitted that the Act has been enacted with the purpose that the parents should have a say in fixing of the fees, so that the managements do not charge exorbitant fees and indulge in profiteering. They submit that, Section 10 of the said Act provides that the disputes between the parents and the management should be decided under the scheme of the said Act and therefore, upon a harmonious construction of Section 10 of the said Act with the preamble of the said Act, it will have to be held that, the orders passed by authority are legal and valid.
8. The alternate submission is made by learned counsel for the Respondent parents, that statute provides for redressal of the dispute only to the management but it does not provide the same to the parents and as such the provisions of the statute will have to be held to be discriminatory being in violation of Article 14 and therefore, unconstitutional. The learned counsel for Respondents pray that the Petition deserves to be dismissed with exemplary costs.
9. The factual scenario in both the Petitions is not in dispute. For the sake of convenience, we will refer to the facts as they arise in Writ Petition No. 7594 of 2017.
10. The said Act has come into force w.e.f. 1st December 2014. The fees charged by the school run by the Petitioner trust were approved by the 'Executive Committee' as constituted in the said Act for the academic year 2017-2018, vid
