1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. The challenge in this appeal is to the impugned orders dated 30 January 2016 and 26 February 2016 made by the City Civil Court at Bombay rejecting the plaint in appellant's Suit No. 3602 of 2015 under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC).

3. The appellant is the original plaintiff and the respondents are the original defendants in Suit No. 3602 of 2015. The cause of action as pleaded in the suit is suspension or attempted suspension of the appellant from the membership of respondent No.1 Club, which is admittedly a public trust registered under the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950 (MPT Act).

4. By the impugned orders, learned Trial Judge has accepted the case of the respondents that the reliefs applied for by the appellant stand covered under the provisions of Section 50 of the MPT Act and therefore, the suit as instituted, without prior written consent of the Charity Commissioner was not maintainable. Learned Trial Judge, in the impugned orders, has basically relied upon the provisions contained in sections 50, 51 and 80 of the MPT Act to hold that the Civil Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a suit of such nature in the absence of prior written consent of the Charity Commissioner.

5. Mr. P.B. Shah, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that learned Trial Judge, after making the impugned order dated 30 January 2016, has made yet another order dated 26 February 2016, purporting to invoke the provisions of section 80 of the MPT Act. He submits that the impugned order dated 30 January 2016 and the impugned order dated 26 February 2016 contradict each other, because, the impugned order dated 30 January 2016 proceeds on the basis that the suit, but for the absence of prior written consent from the Charity Commissioner is maintainable. Whereas, the impugned order dated 26 February 2016, proceeds on the basis that even otherwise, the suit is not maintainable in terms of section 80 of the MPT Act. Mr. Shah submits that the reasoning in both the impugned orders is infirm and accordingly, both the impugned orders, deserve to be set aside in this appeal.

6. Mr. Shah, without prejudice to the aforesaid, further submits that the respondents have pointed out no provisions under the MPT Act where under the appellant can obtain redressal from any of the authorities under the MPT Act in the matter of reliefs as prayed for in the suit. Mr. Shah, therefore, submits that in case the impugned order dated 26 February 2016 made by the learned Trial Judge is upheld, a situation will arise whereby, the appellant, will be deprived of the opportunity of seeking redress, both, before the Civil Court as well as the authorities under the MPT Act. Mr. Shah, therefore, submits that unless the respondents satisfy this court that the appellant is entitled to at least seek redressal from the authorities under the MPT Act, it would be improper to sustain the impugned orders, thereby, foreclosing all opportunities of redressal to the appellant. Mr. Shah, relying upon decision of the Hon'ble Supreme court in Sahebgouda (dead) by Lrs. And ors. Vs. Ogeppa and ors. ( 2003) 6 SCC 151, submits that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not to be readily inferred. Rather, such provisions, must be strictly construed and the onus lies on the party seeking ouster of the civil court's jurisdiction.

7. Mr. Shah submits that the reliefs as prayed for in the suit are to redress the appellant's personal and private rights. He submits that such a suit is therefore, maintainable, even in the absence of prior written consent of the Charity Commissioner. In this regard, Mr. Shah relies upon decision in Vidarbha Kshatriya Mali Shikshan Sanstha by its President Shri Wasudorao Dattaji Sonar vs. Mahatma Fuley Shikshan Samiti, Amravati through its President Ruprao Bhimrao Yawale - 1986 Mh.L.J. 773; The Breach Candy Swimming Bath Trust and ors. vs. Dipesh Mehta and ors. ( Order dated 29th