2017 Supreme(Bom) 1105
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT NAGPUR
B.R. Gavai, Indira Jain, JJ.
Kavish, S/o. Bharat Gahankari - Applicant
Versus
State of Maharashtra, Through P.S.O., Karanja (Lad), Tq. Karanja, Distt. Washim and Anr. - Respondents
Criminal Application (Apl) No. 135 of 2016
Decided On : 30-01-2017
For the Applicant :Mr. A.J. Thakkar, Advocate.
For the Respondent:Mr. R.S. Nayak, A.P.P., Mr. P.R. Agrawal, Advocate.
Headnote:Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 305 and 306-Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 482-Abetment of suicide.-Since allegations in FIR prima facie not disclosing offence against applicant hence FIR filed against him quashed and set aside.
It could thus be seen that the deceased was suffering from mental ailment. It appears that the impugned First Information Report has been filed by way of afterthought. Even taking into consideration the allegations in the First Information Report at its face value, the case under Section 305 of the Indian Penal Code would not be made out. Accepting that the applicant had taken suspicion against the deceased that he teased and scolded the deceased and on that count, he instigated him to commit suicide, it appears that since the deceased was a person suffering from mental ailment, he had taken the unfortunate step to give an end to his life.
B.R. Gavai, J.
Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. Heard by consent.
2. The petitioner has approached this Court praying for quashing and setting aside First Information Report bearing No.161 of 2015 for the offence punishable under Section 305 of the Indian Penal Code.
3. The F.I.R. is lodged at the instance of respondent no.2 complaining therein that the applicant, who is a teacher in a School, had made false allegations of teasing his son Gaurav, as a result of which he committed suicide by jumping into the well. The law with regard to scope of Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code has been considered by the Division Bench of this Court in Criminal Application (APL) No.332 of 2016, decided on 5.8.2016, which is reported in 2016 ALLMR Criminal 4328 (Dilip s/o. Ramrao Shirasao and Others v. State of Maharashtra and another). It will be appropriate to refer to the following observations of the said Judgment.
"13. The Apex Court in Sanju @ Sanjay Sengar's case considered the earlier judgments in paragraphs 9 to 12 of the said judgment. It would be appropriate to refer to the same "
9. In Swamy Prahaladdas v. State of M.P. & Anr., 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 438, the appellant was charged for an offence under Section 306 I.P.C. on the ground that the appellant during the quarrel is said to have remarked the deceased 'to go and die'. This Court was of the view that mere words uttered by the accused to the deceased 'to go and die' were not even prima facie enough to instigate the deceased to commit suicide.
10. In Mahendra Singh v. State of M.P., 1995 Supp.(3) SCC 731, the appellant was charged for an offence under Section 306 I.P.C basically based upon the dying declaration of the deceased, which reads as under:
"My mother-in-law and husband and sister-in-law (husband's elder brother's wife) harassed me. They beat me and abused me. My husband Mahendra wants to marry a second time. He has illicit connections with my sister-in-law. Because of those reasons and being harassed I want to die by burning."
11. This Court, considering the definition of 'abetment' under Section 107 I.P.C., found that the charge and conviction of the appellant for an offence under Section 306 is not sustainable merely on the allegation of harassment to the deceased. This Court further held that neither of the ingredients of abetment are attracted on the statement of the deceased.
12. In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618, this Court while considering the charge framed and the conviction for an offence under Section 306 I.P.C. on the basis of dying declaration recorded by an Executive Magistrate, in which she had stated that previously there had been quarrel between the deceased and her husband and on the day of occurrence she had a quarrel with her husband who had said that she could go wherever she wanted to go and that thereafter she had poured kerosene on herself and had set fire. Acquitting the accused this Court said :
"A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. If it transpires to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and difference in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and difference were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged for abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty."
14. After considering the earlier judgments, Their Lordships observed thus at paragraph 13.
"13........It is in a fit of anger and emotional. Secondly, the alleged abusive words, said to have been told to the deceased were on 25th July, 1998 ensued by quarrel. The deceased was found hanging on 27th July, 1998. Assuming that the deceased had taken the abusive language seriously, he had enough time