2017 Supreme(Bom) 1366

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BHARATI H. DANGRE, J.
Dattatraya Laxman Bagdi – Appellant
Versus
State of Maharashtra – Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 576 of 2001
Decided On : 28-08-2017

Headnote:Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Sections 7 and 13(2)-Conviction and sentence under.-Sentence imposed by trial Court, if falls in line with object of sentencing policy, is just and proper.

       The prosecution has proved the case against accused No. 1 (appellant) by cogent and reliable evidence and the guilt of the accused No. 1 is established beyond doubt and sentenced him by the trial Court is proportionate to the nature of offence committed by the appellant. The trial Court has taken the entire evidence on record and on consideration of the factual and legal scenario in the said matter has recorded that the appellant is guilty of the offences with which he is charged and imposed penalty by the impugned judgment dated 30th July, 2001 in special Case No. 3 of 2000 which needs to be upheld and the appeal filed by the present appellant deserves to be rejected.

       Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Sections 7 and 13(2)-Illegal gratification.-Demand and acceptance of bribe by accused from complainant must be proved by cogent and convincing evidence on record.

       The entry in the register of mutation is not to be transferred to the record of the rights until it has been duly certified by the Circle Inspector. The trial Court is perfectly justified in observing that merely because on 29.08.1999 intimation was given to the complainant, the process of recording name in the record of rights was not complete. It can be seen from the complaint of the complainant that the appellant also threatened that if the amount is not paid, he will ask the Circle Inspector to withdraw the said entry.

       It can thus be seen from the record which reveals that on 3.12.1999 copy of the 7/12 extract was not supplied to the complainant and he was totally unaware of the certification of the mutation entry of his purchased land for which the appellant had demanded the money. Hence, Court does not find substance in the contention of the counsel for the appellant that since the work of mutation was already done, there was no occasion for the complainant to raise demand. On the other hand it can be clearly seen that the appellant was duty bound to effect mutation entry and record name of the appellant in the record of rights. However, he attempted to accept the amount for discharge of his duty, which is in the form of illegal gratification and the complainant who was left with no option and not in position to know the progress of his application, requesting for mutation entry, was compelled to meet illegal demand by the complainant. The prosecution has adduced sufficient evidence to prove demand and acceptance of the amount by way of an illegal gratification in discharge of his duty by the appellant who is a public servant and clearly falls within the purview of Section 7 of the P.C. Act. The said argument of the counsel of the appellant, therefore, needs to be rejected.

       Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Section 19-Sanction for prosecution.-Grant of sanction is administrative function, intended to protect public servants against frivolous and vexatious litigation.

       It is settled position that the grant of sanction is an administrative function and it intended a protection to public servants against frivolous and vexatious litigation. At the same time grant of sanction also ensures that the dishonest officer indulging himself into an act of corruption by accepting an illegal gratification is brought before law and is tried in accordance with law. This authority granting sanction has to be appraised of all the relevant materials and after applying his mind to the material placed before him he has to take conscious decision as to whether fact would reveal commission of an offence under the relevant provisions.

       It is not necessary that an elaborate discussion in that regard in the order is needed but the decision making the relevant material should be reflected in the order to arrive at a conclusion that the sanctioning authority has examined the relevant material placed before him. In the present case, the perusal of the evidence of PW 2 who accorded sanction, in the capacity as a SDO, and perusal of the sanction order reflects that the sanctioning authority has applied his mind to the material placed before him and arrived at a conscious decision to prosecute the appellant and it also cannot be said that the draft sanction order was mechanically accepted by the Sanctioning Authority, as has been attempted to be canvassed before Court. The PW No. 2 is a Law Graduate and in the cross- examination he was extensively cross-examined to reflect his non-application of mind but it is an attempt in vain. The order granting sanction clearly reflects the material considered by the sanctioning authority and his application of mind. Court therefore does not find substance in the said point raised by the counsel for the appellant.

       Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Section 19(1)(c)-Sanction for prosecution.-Appointing authority is competent authority to grant sanction for prosecution of appointee.

       In the light of the law referred to above, an irresistible conclusion can be drawn that the power to remove a person flows from the power to appoint and in order to ascertain as to who has the power to remove Talathi to be seen as to who has the power to appoint. In the present case, the appellant was appointed by the SDO and it is the SDO or any officer higher in rank than the SDO who has power to remove him and therefore no fault can be found with the sanction order granted by PW No. 2.