Liability arising out of the breach of contract is of a civil nature and not criminal. Criminal proceedings should not be used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta.

Vasanti A Naik, J.

1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. The criminal writ petition is heard finally at the stage of admission with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties.

2. By this writ petition, the petitioner seeks the quashing of the first information report registered against the petitioner for an offence punishable under section 420 read with section 34 of the Penal Code.

3. Few facts giving rise to the petition are stated thus:

The petitioner and the respondent No.4 had entered into an agreement of sale in respect of plot No.96 at Mouza Sawangi in Wardha District on 07/03/2007. The parties were bound by the terms and conditions recorded in the agreement of sale dated 07/03/2007. There were some disputes between the parties and the petitioner did not execute the sale deed of the property that was agreed to be sold by the agreement dated 07/03/2007. On 28/02/2017, i.e. ten years after the execution of the agreement of sale, the respondent No.4 lodged a report alleging therein that the petitioner had committed an offence punishable under section 420 of the Penal Code. It was alleged by the respondent No.4 in the said complaint that the petitioner and the respondent No.4 had entered into an agreement for selling the plot of land for a sum of Rs.2,30,750/- and a sum of Rs.80,000/- was paid by the respondent No.4 to the petitioner towards earnest amount and the balance consideration was liable to be paid by the applicant from time to time. It is alleged in the complaint that the petitioner and his partner were called upon by the respondent No.4 from time to time to execute the sale deed of the concerned plot in favour of the respondent No.4 and/or to return the amount that was paid to the petitioner towards earnest money and the consideration for the execution of the sale deed. It is alleged in the complaint that the petitioner started avoiding the respondent No.4 by not receiving his calls and by disconnecting and switching off the phone. It is alleged in the complaint that the petitioner had cheated the respondent No.4.

4. On the basis of the first information report, the respondent Nos.1 to 3 investigated in the matter and on the basis of the material, secured by the respondent No.3 during the investigation, registered an offence punishable under section 420 of the Penal Code against the petitioner. The petitioner has sought the quashing and setting aside of the first information report registered against him as according to him, the ingredients of the provisions of section 420 of the Penal Code cannot be made out on the basis of the first information report as also the material on the basis of which the crime is registered.

5. Shri J.M. Gandhi, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that an agreement of sale was executed between the petitioner and the respondent No.4 in the year 2007 and more than ten years later the respondent No.4 has falsely filed the complaint against the petitioner with a view to pressurise the petitioner in a matter arising out of a contract and which is clearly of a civil nature. It is submitted that the essential ingredient of the offence punishable under section 420 of the Penal Code is that, there should be a dishonest intention to deceive another person. It is submitted that on the basis of the first information report, even if it is accepted at its face value as also the documents available with the respondent Nos.1 to 3, it cannot be said that the essential ingredient for the offence punishable under section 420 of the Penal Code could be made out. It is submitted that similar type of cases came up before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and by the judgments, reported in (2012) 2 SCC (Criminal) 650 (Thermax Ltd. v. K.M.Johny), AIR 2008 SC 251 (Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal) and 1999 Cri.L.J. 598 (Nageshwar Prasad Singh v. Narayan Singh), it is held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that a liability, if any, arising out of a breach of contract would be of a civ