The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement for pleadings to disclose cause of action, be material, and necessary, while also avoiding frivolous or unnecessary content, in accordance with the provisions of Order VI Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the relevant sections of the Representation of People Act, 1951.

1. This is an application (Exh.19) filed under Order VI Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure urging the Court to strike out the pleadings of the petitioner.

2. The application is strongly opposed by the petitioner submitting that it is devoid of any substance and has been filed belatedly.

3. Shri S.P. Dharmadhikari, learned senior counsel for the respondent, who has filed this application, submits that the pleadings contained in Paragraphs-21, 28 and 23(xvii) do not make out any cause of action and are vexatious, unnecessary and embarrassing for the respondent. Therefore, he submits that these pleadings deserve to be struck out as per settled principles of law.

4. Shri M.P. Khanjanchi, learned counsel for the petitioner, disagreeing with the contentions of the learned senior counsel, submits that these pleadings do disclose cause of action except for the pleadings contained in paragraph-23 (xvii), which have been made only to show the conduct of the respondent in the election process. He further submits that the pleadings contained in paragraphs-21 and 28 are absolutely necessary to enable the petitioner to adduce evidence on the point that if the respondent was not to be in the fray, the voters would have cast their votes in favour of the petitioner, who had won the second highest number of votes at the election, the constituency being traditionally the stronghold of Shivsena. He submits that these pleadings are in consonance with the right of the petitioner under Section 101(a) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 ('R.P. Act' for short). Alternately, he submits that these pleadings could be considered as weak pleadings which by itself would not be a ground for their being struck out. He further submits that the pleadings in paragraph-23(xvii) have been made only to demonstrate that his earlier assertions were false. Lastly, he also submits that this application is not maintainable as in the written statement filed by the respondent no foundation in this regard has been laid.

5. About the last objection taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the present application is not maintainable, I must say that the objection finds no support in the facts of the case. In the written statement, paragraph-24 (page332), it has been specifically averred by the respondent that Zilla Parishad is not included in the definition of appropriate government given under Section 2(b) of the R.P. Act. It is further contended that even if it is assumed for the sake of argument, though not admitted, that the erstwhile firm of the respondent had entered into contract with the Zilla Parishad, Nagpur, subsisting on the date of filing of his nomination form, that would not incur any disqualification for the respondent, because Zilla Parishad is not the “appropriate government” for the purposes of Section 9A of the R.P. Act. These averments would show that the objection now taken in the application has its foundation in the written statement and therefore, this would not be a case wherein the respondent could be said to have relinquished his ground of defence or attack or has awaken belatedly as an afterthought action. For this very reason, in my respectful submission, the ratio of the case of Neena Vikram Verma Vs. Balmukund Singh Gautam & Others, reported in (2013)5, Supreme Court Cases, 673, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in which it is laid down that when a contention is not raised earlier, which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack, would have to be called as relinquished by the party concerned, would have no application to the facts of the present case. Thus, the application as filed by the respondent is maintainable and the objection taken in this regard by the learned counsel for the petitioner is rejected.

6. In the case of Dhartipakar Madan Lal Agarwal Vs. Rajiv Gand