B.R. Gavai, J.

1. This matter is placed before us as per the orders passed by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for answering the following question:

“Whether conviction of an Indian by a foreign Court for the offence committed in that country can be taken notice of by the Courts or authorities in India and such conviction would be binding on Courts and authority in India while trying such person for such offence in India?

2. When the matter was listed before us on 21/02/2018, with the consent of the parties, the question which is referred to us has been reframed as thus:

(1) Whether conviction of an Indian by a foreign Court for the offence committed in that country can be taken notice of by the Courts or authorities in India and as to whether such conviction would be binding on Courts and authorities in India while exercising judicial and quasi judicial powers?

3. Since we are called upon to only answer the question, reference to the factual matrix would not be necessary.

4. We have heard Shri Dada, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant in the First Appeal and Shri Ponda, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent. Though lengthy and elaborate arguments have been advanced by both Shri Dada and Shri Ponda, we will only deal with such of the arguments that are necessary for answering the reference.

5. Shri Dada submitted that, the judgment and order of conviction by a foreign court for the offence committed in that country cannot even be looked into or no notice be taken of by the Indian Courts. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that, the view taken by the erstwhile Nagpur High Court in the case of Govind Kesheo Powar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others (1955 Cri. L.J. 1275 : AIR 1955 Nag 236), lays down the correct position of law. He submitted that, the view taken by the Nagpur High Court is in tune with the view taken by the House of Lords in Huntington vs. Attrill (1893 House of Lords 150), Kings Bench Division in Banco De Vizcaya vs. Don Alphonso De Borbon ([1935] K.B. 140), Queens Bench in United States of America vs. Inkley (1989 1 Q.B. 255), Kings Bench in Raulin vs. Fischer (2 Kings Bench 1911 page 93), Chancery Division in Frankfurther vs. W. L. Exner Limited (1947 1 Chancery Division 629), Ogden vs. Folliott (3 TR 725), Wolff vs. Oxholm (6 M & S 91)and Lynch vs. The Provisional Government of Paraguay. The learned Senior Counsel also relied on the Judgment of Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Union of India and others vs. Susanta Kumar Mukharjee (1977 II L.L.J. 460). The learned Senior Counsel further submits that, it has been consistently held that the Court of one country would not directly or indirectly execute decree of the Court of another country and if the Court of one country is permitted to take note of decree of the Court of another country, it will amount to nothing else but indirect enforcement of decree of the foreign Court.

6. Per contra, Shri Ponda, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent, submits that, though judgment and order of conviction passed by the foreign Court may not be binding on the Courts in India, the same, however, could be noticed and recognized while exercising judicial or quasi judicial powers by the Courts and authorities as the case may be in India. The learned Counsel submits that, enforcement of a judgment of foreign court is distinct from recognizing or noticing the said judgment by the Courts and authorities in India. In this respect, the learned Counsel relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Brace Transport Corporation of Monrovia, Bermuda vs. Orient Middle East Lines Ltd, Saudi Arabia and others (1995 SUPP (2) SC,. 280). The learned Counsel also relies on the judgment of King's Bench in Ralli Brothers vs. Compania Naviera Sota Y Aznar (1920 (2) K.B. 287), of the Court of Appeal in the case of Regazzoni vs. K.C. Sethia (1954(3) W.L.R. 79), of the Chancery Division in the case of Emery vs. Emery (1959 Chancery D