The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the word 'court' in Section 36 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, and its implications on the enforcement of arbitral awards.

1. There is a preliminary objection — at least that is how it is described — by the Judgment Debtor represented by Dr Chandrachud. Respondent No.1 is a partner of the Judgment Debtor firm. It is, I think, something of a misnomer to say that there is anything preliminary about this objection. The Award dated 21st January 2011 has been in execution for some time. The Execution Application itself is now seven years old. There have been Garnishee Proceedings against banks and amounts have been received in this Court. Those are the subject matter of separate orders. The Award itself was in the amount of Rs.40,57,895/- (inclusive of legal expenses of Rs.2,25,000/-).

2. The objection on behalf of the Judgment Debtors is this. According to them, following the 2015 amendment with effect from 23rd October 2015 to the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Arbitration Act”), Section 36 uses the word “Court” in quite distinct contexts in its sub-section. Section 36 of the Arbitration & Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 as amended reads:

“36. Enforcement — Where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under section 34 has expired, then, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), such award shall be enforced in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court.

(2) Where an application to set aside the arbitral award has been filed in the Court under section 34, the filing of such an application shall not by itself render that award unenforceable, unless the Court grants an order of stay of the operation of the said arbitral award in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3), on a separate application made for that purpose.

(3) Upon filing of an application under sub-section (2) for stay of the operation of the arbitral award, the Court may, subject to such conditions as it may deem fit, grant stay of the operation of such award for reasons to be recorded in writing:

Provided that the Court shall, while considering the application for grant of stay in the case of an arbitral award for payment of money, have due regard to the provisions for grant of stay of a money decree under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.” (Emphasis added)

3. The distinction that Dr Chandrachud draws is in the use of the lower case ‘court’ in Section 36(1) as opposed to the capitalised ‘Court’ in sub-sections 2, 3 and in Section 34 of the Act, There is an inconsistency in the printed copies of the Arbitration & Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015. The publication from Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd. uses the lower case “c”. The one from Professional Book Publishers uses the capitalised “C” throughout. In this judgment, I have referred to the Gazette copy of the Act. It is his submission that Section 2(1)(e) contains a definition of only the latter use, i.e. Court with the upper case “C” and it reads thus:

“2(1)(e) “Court” means—

(i) in the case of an arbitration other than international commercial arbitration, the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes;

(ii) in the case of international commercial arbitration, the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, and in other cases, a High Court having jurisdiction to hear appeals from decrees of courts subordinate to that High Court”

4. He therefore submits that the enforcement of an award under Section 36(1) must be through a ‘court’ that has the necessary pecuniary