2018 Supreme(Bom) 1637
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
A.A. Sayed, S.C. Gupte, JJ.
Shri. Shailendra Madhukar Bhalerao – Appellant
Versus
Sou. Suruchi Shailendra Bhalerao - Respondent
Family Court Appeal No. 215 of 2008
Decided On : 26-11-2018
For the Appellant : Mr. Prashant Bhavake
For the Respondent: Mr. Y.G. Thorat, i/b. A.B. Tajane
Headnote:
Hindu Marriage Act - Section 13(1)(ib) - Divorce petition on the ground of cruelty - Cross-examination - Deserting spouse to bring cohabitation permanently - Granting a decree of divorce on ground of separation - Appellant and Respondent were married - They have a son by name son was a minor petition as well impugned order - Respondent left matrimonial home parties have been living separately - Appellant filed a divorce petition on ground of cruelty - Petition was dismissed by Family Court parties continued to live separately ever since original separation - They have had no relations ever since - When Respondent preformed thread ceremony of their son - Whilst living at her parental home, the Appellant and his immediate family members such as parents, brother – Held, Only contact they have had so far was through a few phone calls made twenty years have elapsed since separation during which there was no single attempt to resume cohabitation - Their only son is now 23 years and has lived apart from his father for over twenty years - Is there any sanctity or, for matter, even semblance of a purpose left in continuing this legal tie - Is there any stake of either party or, for matter, of the society in preserving this broken marriage our mind the answer seems to be clear - It would be unjust not to sever marital tie in facts of case consistent with good conscience, demands marriage be dissolved - Petition is allowed
S.C. GUPTE, J.
1. This family Court appeal challenges a dismissal order passed by the Family Court at Pune on a divorce petition filed by the Appellant husband on the ground of desertion under Section 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act.
2. The facts of the Appellant's case may be briefly stated as follows :
The Appellant and the Respondent were married on 20 December 1994. They have a son by the name of 'Shardul'. (The son, who was a minor on the date of the petition as well as on the date of the impugned order, is now a major, aged 23 years.) The Respondent left the matrimonial home and the parties have been living separately since February 1998. In 1999, the Appellant filed a divorce petition on the ground of cruelty. The petition was dismissed by the Family Court on 25 August 2000. The parties, however, continued to live separately ever since their original separation in February 1998. They have had no relations ever since. On 31 May 2008, when the Respondent preformed the thread ceremony of their son, Shardul, whilst living at her parental home, the Appellant and his immediate family members such as parents, brother, etc. were not invited. The only communication they had was through a few phone calls. This state of affairs continued till the filing of the petition, i.e. till 20 July, 2006. (It continues till date, i.e. till the date of this order.) On these facts, it is the submission of the Appellant that the Respondent has deserted him; the statutory period of separation has passed long by; and divorce ought to be granted.
3. The parties were sent to a marriage counsellor and even the Family Court explored the possibility of a mutual settlement, which did not come about. The trial thereafter commenced, when the parties led evidence before the Court. The Family Court, after hearing the parties, dismissed the petition on the ground that though the parties were admittedly living apart since the last over ten years, the separation was at the instance of the Appellant husband; the Respondent wife's evidence in this behalf was practically unchallenged or unrebutted.
4. Relying on the decisions of our Court in the cases of Jaya Vijay Wavikar vs. Vijay @ Vijaykumar Shankar Wavikar, 2013 (3) Mh.L.J. 886 and X husband vs. Y wife, 2014(4) Bom.C.R. 168 learned Counsel for the Appellant submits that there has been effective desertion on the part of the Respondent wife; it is the wife who left the matrimonial home and for the last over twenty years (ten years before the impugned order and ten years thereafter, i.e. during the pendency of this appeal), there has been no attempt on her part of resuming co-habitation. Learned Counsel for the Respondent counters this by submitting that the wife's oral evidence that the husband had asked her to leave the matrimonial house was unchallenged in the cross-examination and hence, it has been proved as a matter of fact that the husband was responsible for the couple's separation.
5. As this Court explained in X husband (supra), the essential requisites of desertion have long been settled by the Supreme Court in Bipinchandra Jaisinghbhai Shah vs. Prabhavati, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 176 by bringing out essential conditions in a case of desertion. Along with the factum of separation, an intention must be shown on the part of the deserting spouse to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Secondly, desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case. Thirdly, the offence of desertion commences when the fact of separation and the animus deserendi coexist. They, however, need not commence at the same time. It may be that the de facto separation may have commenced without the necessary animus, but at a later date, if there is animus, from that moment onwards they coexist and if they so continue for the requisite length of time, the matrimonial offence of desertion is complete and divorce may follow.
6. In X husband (supra), the facts before this