Nutan D. Sardessai, J.

Heard forthwith with the consent of the learned Advocate for the parties.

2. Rule.

3. Shri Mahesh Amonkar, learned Standing Counsel waives service of notice on behalf of the respondent.

4. The petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. takes exception to the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Vasco for quashing the proceedings initiated against the petitioner under Section 18(a)(i) r/w. Section 27(a) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 ('the Act' for short hereinafter).

5. Heard Shri J. Godinho, learned Advocate for he petitioner who contended that the respondents had lodged a complaint against the company Maxmet Life Sciences Pvt. Ltd. and two others including the petitioner herein under Section 32(1) of the said Act for an offence punishable under Section 18(a)(i) r/w. Section 27(d) of the Act. In the said complaint it was set out that the petitioner as one of the directors of the accused company was responsible for its day to day affairs and liable for punishment for the offence committed under Section 18(a)(i) r/w. Section 27(d) of the Act. It was his contention that a bare statement in the complaint was not adequate to rope the petitioner as an accused rather it was his contention that in its reply filed to the respondent on behalf of the company, it was made abundantly clear to the respondent that their General Manager was in fact the person in charge and responsible to the company. He place reliance in State of Haryana v/s. Brij Lal Mittal and Others, (1998) 5 SCC 343, National Small Industries Corporation Ltd. V/s. Harmeet Singh Paintal and another, (2010) 3 SCC 330, State of NCT of Delhi through Prosecuting Officer, Insecticides, Government of NCT, Delhi v/s. Rajiv Khurana, (2010) 11 SCC 469, Pooja Ravinder Devidasani v/s. State of Maharashtra and another, (2014) 16 SCC 1 and A.V. Mody v/s. S.R. Salunke, (1999) 3 MhLJ 850.

6. Shri M. Amonkar, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents submitted that the judgment relied upon by the petitioner were clearly distinguishable. Besides, the petitioner had not filed any reply to the notice taking a stand which was now sought to be taken in this petition that a different person was in-charge and responsible for the affairs of the company. There was a clear averment in the complaint that the petitioner with another person was clearly in-charge of and responsible for the affairs of the company and therefore there was no basis for the petition which had to be dismissed.

7. I would consider their submissions in the light of the judgments and pleadings in the complaint and decide the petition accordingly.

8. In Brij Lal Mittal , a two Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court held while dealing with the appeal under the Act that in instances where the offences are committed by Company, simply because a person is a director of the company he does not vicariously become liable for the offence committed by the company. It must be shown that he was in charge of the company and also responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. The vicarious liability of a person for being prosecuted for an offence committed under the Act by a company arises if at the material time he was in charge of and was also responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. Simply because a person is a director of the company, it does not necessarily mean that he fulfils both the above requirements so as to make him liable. Conversely, without being a director a person can be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. It was found in the facts of the case that except a bald statement in the complaint that the respondent were directors of the manufacturers, there were no any allegation prima facie that they were responsible for the conduct of the business and in that view the matter is quashed and set aside.

9. In National Small Industries Corporation Ltd., another two Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court while dealing with