The court emphasized the importance of presenting all crucial evidence before the Labour Court in industrial dispute cases, highlighting that the suppression of vital evidence can lead to an incomplete assessment of misconduct.

1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties. This review petition seeks review of an order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.154 of 2007. By the order under review, this Court dismissed the writ petition filed against his employer by the original Petitioner, who is the Review Petitioner herein.

2. Since 19 April 1988, the Petitioner had been working as a bus driver with the Respondent. On 10 May 1996, the State Transport bus driven by the Petitioner collided with a truck coming in the opposite direction, resulting into the death of two passengers and injuries to several others. The Respondent issued a charge-sheet against the Petitioner, alleging negligent and rash driving amounting to misconduct. The Enquiry Officer found the Petitioner guilty of gross negligence in driving and held his misconduct causing severe damage and inconvenience to the Corporation and the public, and in breach of departmental circulars/directives, to be proved. The Respondent, thereafter, issued a show-cause notice concerning the proposed disciplinary action and after hearing him, dismissed him from service with effect from 27 May 1997. Being aggrieved by the dismissal, the Petitioner raised an industrial dispute, which was referred as Reference (IDA) No.811 of 1998 to IV Labour Court at Mumbai. The Labour Court held the enquiry to be fair and proper, findings not to be perverse, and quantum of punishment proportionate, rejecting the reference.

3. The subject matter of challenge in the original petition involved three aspects, the first being fairness and propriety of the enquiry, the second, actual proof of misconduct and the third, the propriety of the disciplinary action itself from the standpoint of principles of natural justice. This Court, after considering the requirement of principles of natural justice, as applicable to domestic enquiries, held that the Labour Court's conclusion that the enquiry could not be said to be unfair or improper, was a plausible conclusion based on evidence and not vitiated on account of disregard of any relevant or germane circumstance or material or consideration of any irrelevant or non-germane circumstance or material. There is no case made out in the review petition so far as this conclusion is concerned.

4. Coming now to the disciplinary action and its propriety, the case urged before the Court on behalf of the Petitioner was that the person issuing the charge-sheet and conducting the domestic enquiry had himself acted as a disciplinary authority and passed the dismissal order. In other words, the person acted as complainant, prosecutor and judge combined. This Court did not agree with the Petitioner's contention. Nothing is pointed out to show that that part of the order calls for any review under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure or analogous principles.

5. The third and the most important aspect of the matter, which concerns proof of misconduct of the Petitioner workman, directly bears on the propriety of the conclusion drawn by the Enquiry Officer and the Court. On this aspect, this Court noted in its order under review that the Labour Court, on the issue of proof of misconduct, had accepted the management's case on the basis of a report submitted by the reporter, panchnama and other relevant documents as also oral evidence led by the parties. This Court noted that the Labour Court's conclusion was indeed based on some material before the Court, which can support it. This Court, in this context, also referred to the Petitioner's own evidence before the Labour Court, observing inter alia that the explanations given by the Petitioner workman were matters of assessment of evidence. What this Court concluded basically was that based on the material before the Court, namely, report of reporter, panchnama, statement of witnesses and evidence of the workman himself, it could not be said that the conclusions drawn by the Court were such as no reasonable person duly instructed in law could hav