The main legal point established in the judgment is the distinction between Section 304(Part-I) and Section 304(Part-II) of the Indian Penal Code, emphasizing the presence of intention to cause death in Part-I and the absence of intention but presence of knowledge regarding the probable consequence of the injury inflicted in Part-II.

JUDGMENT :

Sunil B. Shukre, J.

This is an Appeal which questions the legality and correctness of the Judgment and Order dated 2nd May 2005 rendered in Sessions Trial No. 123 of 1997 by the Sessions Judge, Nagpur.

2. In brief the facts of the present Appeal are as under :

There were two accused persons, one is the Appellant himself and the other one is Suresh Gagadhar Awathe, who were prosecuted and tried for an offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. They were alleged to be involved in an incident which took place on 20th December 1996 at 17.30 hours, at village Khapa, District Nagpur.

3. It so happened that both these accused persons were bridegrooms, who were to marry two daughters of one Bhimrao Gagate on 20th December 1996 at Khapa at the same time and venue. Their marriages with respective brides were solemnized and then there was a time for marriage feast. The feast would be served to several guests attending the marriage, who would be sitting with folded legs on the ground in different rows. The arrangement is traditionally called in marathi as 'Pangat'. While the Pangat feast was at its peak, it is alleged that some differences arose between the accused persons and one guest Deepak Bajirao Marotkar over consumption of a flour boiled butter-milk which is traditionally called in marathi as 'Kadhi'.

4. It is alleged that initially 'Kadhi' was asked for by Deepak and when it was brought for him, he refused to accept the same in his plate. This was not liked by the accused persons. The Accused persons insisted upon Deepak not to turn back on his demand, but Deepak refused to be pursuaded in accepting 'Kadhi'. These differences ultimately led to this Appellant in pulling out a dagger, which he was wearing as a part of traditional wedding dress and assault Deepak by means of dagger. It is alleged that this Appellant stabbed Deepak at different portions in his lumber region causing six incised wounds and two contusions, which all ultimately resulted in death of Deepak.

5. The complaint and its investigation and then the prosecution and trial of this Appellant and his co-accused for the offence of murder followed and the trial concluded in acquittal the co-accused of the Appellant and conviction of the Appellant for an offence punishable under Section 304(Part-I) of Indian Penal Code. By the impugned Judgment and order, the Appellant was convicted and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years together with a fine of Rs. 1000/-, accompanied by a default sentence of further rigorous imprisonment for three months.

6. Being aggrieved by the impugned Judgment and order, the Appellant is now before this Court in the present Appeal.

7. I have heard Mr. Nawab, the learned Counsel for Appellant and Mr. Joshi, the learned APP for State. I have also gone through the paper book and record and proceedings of the present Appeal.

8. The learned Counsel for Appellant has made submissions in a fair manner and giving up his challenge to the findings of guilt, insofar as it relates to causing of death of Deepak, the learned Counsel has made submission only with regard to the conversion of the conviction from Section 304 (Part-I) of Indian Penal Code to Section 304 (Part-II) of Indian Penal Code and concomitantly about the quantum of the sentence.

9. Per contra, the learned APP submits that the trial court has already imposed mild punishment by taking lenient view and having regard to the evidence brought on record, there is hardly any scope in this case to further reduce the sentence.

10. I would have accepted the submissions made across the bar on behalf of the State by the learned APP, had it been a case that the guilt of the accused so found in the facts and circumstances of the case had attracted only Part-I of Section 304 of Indian Penal Code. But, on a closure scrutiny of the evidence available on record, I find that the guilt of the accused in the present case, insofar as it relates to causing