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2019 Supreme(Bom) 1280

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
N.J. Jamadar, J.
Rajhans R. Vhatkar through Legal Heirs Smt. Kempava R. Vhatkar through Legal Heirs & Ors. Appellant
Versus
Shri Rajaram Shivaji Pol - Respondents
Writ Petition No. 10219 of 2004 WITH Writ Petition No. 2456 of 2012
Decided On : 26-07-2019

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellant : Shri.S.S.Redekar, Mr.P.G.Karande Adv.
For the Respondent: Mr. Bhushan Walimbe Adv.

Headnote:

Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles 227, 141 - Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 - Sections 85, 32/P, 32-O - Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 - Section 257 - Jural Relationship - Fraud - Being aggrieved by judgment and order of appellate authority respondents approached Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal by invoking its revisional jurisdiction - MRT by judgment and order in Revision was persuaded to set aside order passed by appellate authority and restore order passed by Tahsildar & ALT holding respondent to be a tenant of suit land - As finding of authority regarding tenancy attained finality Regular Civil Suit came to be decreed by Civil Court by judgment and decree - It seems that said decree of perpetual injunction was not subjected to further appeal - Held, It would have been a different matter had ALT held that application was within period of limitation with reference to another factor very edifice of order of ALT was order allegedly passed by this Court on which was not case - Once this substratum of order of ALT goes order falls through completely - It would be simply impermissible in derogation of first principles of law and a travesty of justice to allow said order to stand despite fact that it was obtained by falsely proclaiming that an order was passed by this Court - Neither time lag nor intervening proceedings preclude this Court from setting aside order obtained by fraud - I am of considered opinion that it would be imperative to pass certain orders so as to obviate further complications till time ALT decides application - Petition stands dismissed.

JUDGMENT :

1. These petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India were heard together and can be conveniently disposed of by a common judgment as both the petitions have their genesis in the jural relationship between the deceased petitioner and respondent as landlord and tenant.

2. Though the litigation has a chequered history of almost 45 years, with more than a dozen proceedings, the background facts, necessary for the determination of these petitions, can be summarized as under :Late Rajhans R. Vhatkar, the deceased petitioner (hereinafter referred to as landlord) was the original holder of the agricultural land bearing Survey No.RS 18/A1, admeasuring 4 Acre and 12 Guntha, situated at Hatkanagale, District Kolhapur (hereinafter referred to as ‘the suit land’).

Late Rajaram Bhivaji Pol, the deceased respondent (hereinafter referred to as tenant) claimed to be a tenant thereof. Alleging obstruction to his peaceful possession and cultivation of the suit land, the tenant instituted a suit bearing No.R.C.S. 353 of 1976 for perpetual injunction against the landlord. In the said suit, an issue of tenancy came to be framed and in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 85(A) of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 1948’), the Civil Court referred the said issue to the Agricultural Land Tribunal (ALT) for determination. It was registered as Tenancy Case No.6 of 1978. ALT-Tahasildar, Hatkanagale, by judgment and order dated 12th October 1978, returned a finding that Rajaram was in possession of the suit land as a tenant thereof and was also in actual possession thereof on the date of the institution of the suit. The landlord preferred Tenancy Appeal No.17 of 1979 against the aforesaid determination by Tahasildar & ALT. By judgment and order dated 28th July 1983, in Tenancy Appeal No.17 of 1979, the Sub-divisional Collector, Karvir Division, Kolhapur was persuaded to allow the appeal and set aside the order passed by the ALT. The name of the respondent–Rajaram was directed to be deleted from column No. 7A of the 7/12 extract of the suit land.

3. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order of the appellate authority, the respondents approached the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (MRT) by invoking its revisional jurisdiction. The MRT, by judgment and order dated 21st April 1984, in Revision No. TRA-KP-221/1983, was persuaded to set aside the order passed by the appellate authority and restore the order passed by Tahsildar & ALT holding the respondent to be a tenant of the suit land.

4. The landlord challenged the aforesaid order of MRT in Writ Petition No. 3485 of 1984, before this Court. By judgment and order dated 10th December 1993, this Court dismissed the writ petition and concurred with the findings recorded by the MRT that late Rajaram was the tenant of the suit land. The Special Leave Petition preferred by the landlord bearing No.SLP (Civil) No.21941 of 1994 came to be dismissed by the Supreme Court on 3rd January 1995.

5. As the finding of the authority under the Act, 1948 regarding the tenancy attained finality, Regular Civil Suit No.353 of 1976 came to be decreed by the Civil Court, by judgment and decree dated 16th August 1997. It seems that the said decree of perpetual injunction was not subjected to further appeal.

6. The trigger for second round of litigation between the parties was provided by a communication dated 6th April 1996, by the Sub-divisional Officer, Ichalkaranji declining to delete the name of the tenant from the record of rights of the suit land. The landlord had sought correction in the record of rights on the premise that the landlord Rajhans was under the guardianship of his natural mother Smt.Ratnabai, who was appointed by the District Judge, Kolhapur on 9th January 1954. The late Ratnabai was not legally empowered and competent to lease out the minor’s property without the specific permission of the District Court. Since the tenant Ra

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