The main legal point established in the judgment is that the plain language of the statute must be given pre-eminence, and marginal notes cannot control the meaning of the section if the language employed therein is clear.

JUDGMENT :

Ujjal Bhuyan, J.

Heard Mr. A.V. Anturkar, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Ajinkya Udane, learned counsel for the petitioners; Mr. S.R. Ronghe, learned counsel has appeared on behalf of respondent Nos.1 and 2 by filing caveat; and Mr. S.H. Kankal, learned AGP, Maharashtra for respondent No.3.

2. Challenge made in this writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is to the legality and validity of the order dated 5th May, 2018 passed by the Learned Joint Charity Commissioner, Pune Region, Pune on application filed by respondent Nos.1 and 2 under Section 41E of the Maharashtra Public Trust Act, 1950.

3. From the impugned order itself, it is evident that respondent Nos.1 and 2 had filed the related application contending that petitioner No.1-society which is registered under the Maharashtra Public Trust Act, 1950 as well as under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 has not been managed properly by petitioner Nos. 2 to 12. In addition to that, allegations were made that since the year 1982 when petitioner No.1 came to be established, no Annual General Meeting was held till the year 2013-14. Therefore, prayer was made for restraining the petitioners from managing the affairs of petitioner No.1-society till final decision on the application filed under Section 41E was taken by the learned Joint Charity Commissioner.

4. Petitioners who were arrayed as opponents in the said application contested the claim of respondent Nos.1 and 2.

5. After hearing the matter, learned Joint Charity Commissioner passed the impugned order dated 5th May, 2018 restraining petitioner Nos.2 to 12 from taking any policy decision/final decision till disposal of the main application. It is this order which is under challenge in the present writ petition.

6. Mr. Anturkar, learned senior counsel for the petitioners has referred to Section 41E of the Maharashtra Public Trust Act, 1950 ("1950 Act" hereafter) and contends that the Charity Commissioner has jurisdiction to grant temporary injunction regarding immovable property of the Trust, provided he arrives at the satisfaction that such property is in danger of being wasted, damaged and improperly alienated by any trustee or such trustee threatens or intends to remove or dispose of such property. He submits that no such finding of fact was recorded by the Joint Charity Commissioner. In the absence of recording of such finding, the Joint Charity Commissioner could not have assumed jurisdiction under Section 41E of the 1950 Act. That apart, interim injunction granted by the Joint Charity Commissioner is beyond the scope and ambit of Section 41E. He has also pointed out to the findings recorded by the Joint Charity Commissioner to contend that learned Joint Charity Commissioner did not consider the fact that constitution of petitioner No.1-society was amended, whereby tenure of the Managing Committee was extended from one year to five years.

7. On the other hand, Mr. Ronghe, learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2 submits that the heading of Section 41E clearly reveals that the Joint Charity Commissioner has the power to act for protection of charities. The contents of the section would have to be interpreted keeping in mind the objective of the section as reflected in the section heading. He has also referred to various averments made in his application to point out that the Trust property was in danger of being improperly alienated by the trustees and therefore, filing of the application under Section 41E was fully justified. That apart, he also submits that the main prayer in the application was to restrain petitioner Nos.2 to 12 from carrying out any administrative activity of the Trust in the capacity of trustees. Further submission is that impugned order dated 5th May, 2018 is only an adinterim order operating for more than one and half years now. Hearing of the main application is fixed on 19th December, 2019. At this stage, interference with the interim order dated