JUDGMENT :

Mangesh S. Patil, J.

Heard.

2. Rule. The rule is made returnable forthwith. Learned A.P.P. waives notice for respondent/State. On the request of both the parties the matter is heard finally at the stage of admission.

3. The petitioners are challenging the order passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge Latur on their application (Exhibit 9) whereby their request for discharge was rejected.

4. The petitioners are the employees of a private school. The petitioner No. 1 is the Headmaster, petitioner No. 2 is the teacher and the petitioner No. 3 is the Clerk in that school. It is alleged that the petitioner No. 1 made a demand of bribe of an amount of Rs. 3000/- for issuing a transfer certificate to the son of the complainant. It is alleged that pursuant to such demand money was accepted by the petitioner No. 1 and the other two petitioners abetted commission of such crime. Accordingly they were charge-sheeted for the offences punishable under sections 7, 12, 13(1)(d), 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

5. The petitioners submitted the application (Exhibit 9) seeking discharge primarily on the ground that it is the Director of Education (Secondary and Higher Secondary) who has accorded sanction. In fact initially the Investigating Officer had solicited a sanction to prosecute the petitioners from the Management. However, it was rejected. Subsequently a fresh request was made to the Director of Education, pursuant to which the sanction was accorded by referring to the Government Resolution dated 05.11.2015. By the impugned order the learned Assistant Sessions Judge rejected the application. Hence this writ petition.

6. The learned advocate for the petitioners submitted that in view of the provisions of Section 4 of the The Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as M.E.P.S. Act) and the rules framed thereunder of the year 1981, the petitioners being the employees of a private school, the Management which runs the school would be the authority competent to remove them from the office within the meaning of clause (c) of Sub section 1 of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is pursuant to such a provision that initially the sanction was solicited from the Management. The Management for the elaborate reasons through its communication dated 30.11.2015 refused to accord the sanction. The learned advocate would submit that without disclosing such rejection, pursuant to a Government Resolution dated 05.11.2015 the investigating officer solicited the sanction from the Director of Education, obtained a fresh favourable order and the prosecution was launched by filing the charge-sheet. The learned advocate would submit that in fact when it is the Management which alone was competent to remove the petitioners from the employment under the provisions of Section 4 of the M.E.P.S. Act, the State Government could not have by issuing such a government resolution superseded the statutory provision contained in Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In support of his submission he placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation Vs. Subhash Sindhi Cooperative Housing Society & Oth., (2013) AIR SC 1226.

7. Thus according to the learned advocate, the Director of Education being not the competent authority to remove the petitioners from the employment under the provisions of Section 4 of the M.E.P.S. Act, he was not the competent authority to accord sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act to prosecute them. The Management having already refused to accord sanction the petitioners could not have been prosecuted. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge has failed to consider these aspects and by the impugned order refused to discharge them. The order is not sustainable in law and may be quashed and set aside and the petitioners may be directe