IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU, J.
Ishwarlal Vrajlal Mistry Others – Appellants
Versus
Manohar U. Shetty since deceased through Lrs. & Others – Respondents
Writ Petition Nos. 13100, 13102 of 2018
Decided on : 18-12-2019
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 - Section 2 – Tenants – Claim of compensation – Jurisdiction - Learned counsel for the petitioners in both the writ petitions, has submitted that the Trust itself was a lessee; it is not the owner - It has thus subleased property to the petitioners. Drawing my attention to the lease agreement has argued that what was given to the petitioners was a piece of open land, upon which, by expending huge amounts, the original tenant raised superstructures - Therefore considering nature of the property leased out, the appellate Bench ought to have determined the compensation. Plainly put, the interim compensation must have been on the vacant land, but not on the structures the original tenant has raised - Case holding of Properties Federal Motors and submitted that whatever structure the original tenant has raised would amount to an improvement on the leased property by the tenant. And, while determining compensation, the courts must exclude those improvements from the reckoning. Finally he has submitted that the appellate Bench has considered even the staircase, passage, actual carpet area, and so on, which is impermissible – Held, Finally, the appellate Bench has fixed the rental value of the property in Marble Arch, admeasuring 3188 sq. ft as against has claimed. In fact, the appellate Bench has found that the property is used for residential purposes. The total has, thus, come to per month - Appellate Bench has found the three garages measuring up - They are used for “stitching of readymade garments by the subtenants”. So the appellate Bench has found it, rightly so, to be commercial use. But the appellate Bench has pointed out that the respondent lessor has not spelt out how he claimed compensation - It has felt it to be exorbitant. Then, the appellate Bench considered the locality, purpose, and the nature of business felt that the shops would not fetch more than - As such, the approximate market rent was fixed at the shops - Then, the appellate Bench has examined and analyzed valuation report, besides the Ready between Lady Road portion and City Light Cinema Junction. It has also taken note of the Ready Reckoned the appellants have filed in Appeal - It relates to Zone covering locality where the suit property stands. The valuation in that Ready Reckoned as the appellate Bench notes, is “slightly on the lower side - Before I could determine what may be the reasonable amount, I must examine whether the order impugned is arbitrary or perverse. If it is neither court must not impose my view over that of the appellate Bench. Merely because an alternative view is possible Courts will not upset otherwise well-founded orders of discretion. Judicial interference requires much more than a plausible or a probable alternative view – Appeal disposal of
JUDGMENT :
1. Heard finally at the admission stage by the parties’ consent.
2. There are two writ petitions: W.P. No.13100 of 2018 and W. P. No.13102 of 2018. They both impugn an interim order passed by the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court. To elaborate, the impugned orders stay the operation of the decree secured by the respondent-landlord subject to the writ petitioners’ paying interim compensation.
3. If I go through the details, I note that in 1961 the respondent Trust leased out 435 sq. yards open space to the petitioners in W.P. No.13100 of 2018. The Petitioners could raise a structure and use it for the next 40 years. A formal agreement, it seems, was executed in 1964. Both the Trust and the petitioners-original tenants agreed that the tenants could construct four floors, that is ground-plus-three floors. The initial lease was 40 years, to be renewed one more term: 40 more years.
4. During the lease period, in 1963 the original tenant raised a structure. He constructed five shops on the ground floor and started using three upper floors as lodgings for prospective customers. Similarly, the Trust has leased out the terrace portion of an existing building in the same compound and permitted the original tenant to raise one more floor. That newly to-be-added floor could be used as a residence. Besides that, it has also leased out three garages near the existing building.
5. The lease ended in 2001. Meanwhile, the Trust assigned its leasehold rights to the original respondent, whose legal heirs are now on record. In 2005, the respondent assignee filed RAE & R Suit No.68/120/2005. He sought the tenants’ eviction on the grounds of illegal subletting and change of user. Later, he has also filed RAE Suit No.79/124/2008, about the same property. This time the eviction was sought because the tenant’s sub-lessee has been using the property for illegal and immoral purposes. Eventually, on 30th January 2018, the trial Court decreed both the suits: eviction was ordered.
6. Aggrieved, the original lessees filed four appeals, but they challenged the judgment only in Suit No.79/124/2008. Similarly, the alleged sub-lessee, that is the second defendant, filed Appeal No.160/2018. He, too, challenged only one Judgment, the Judgment in RAE Suit No.68/120/2005.
7. In two appeals, they wanted the appellate Bench of the Small Cause Court to stay the operation of the decree in both the suits. Then, the appellate Bench, through impugned orders, stayed the decree subject to a condition: the tenants, as the appellants, should pay the monthly compensation at the rate determined by the appellate Bench. In this background, the appellants filed two writ petitions—WP No.1300 and 1301 of 2018—against the orders in the two appeals: Appeal No.160/2018 and 161/2018.
Submissions:
Petitioners:
8. Shri Godbole, the learned counsel for the petitioners in both the writ petitions, has submitted that the Trust itself was a lessee; it is not the owner. It has, thus, subleased the property to the petitioners. Drawing my attention to the lease agreement, Shri Godbole has argued that what was given to the petitioners was a piece of open land, upon which, by expending huge amounts, the original tenant raised superstructures. Therefore, considering the nature of the property leased out, the appellate Bench ought to have determined the compensation. Plainly put, the interim compensation must have been on the vacant land, but not on the structures the original tenant has raised.
9. Shri Godbole has emphasised the case holding of Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd., v. Federal Motors (P) Ltd. (2005) 1 SCC 705), and submitted that whatever structure the original tenant has raised would amount to an improvement on the leased property by the tenant. And, while determining compensation, the courts must exclude those improvements from the reckoning. Finally, he has submitted that the appellate Bench has considered even the staircase, passage, actual carpet area, and so on, which is imperm
Atma Ram Properties and Niyas Ahmad Khan v. Mahmood Rahmat Ullah Khan (2008) 7 SCC 539)
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