2019 Supreme(Bom) 2218
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
S.C. Gupte, J.
Balasaheb Govind Basugade - Appellant
Versus
Rajendra Shivaji Kumthekar & Ors. - Respondents
Second Appeal (Stamp) No. 28547 of 2019; Interim Application No. 1 of 2019
Decided On : 28-11-2019
V.G. Rajure, Advocate, Nikhil N Pawar, Advocate, Kuldeep U Nikam, Advocate
The central legal point established in the judgment is that after the enactment of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, no plea of benami transaction could be set up as a defense, and the accrual of cause of action in a suit for possession based on title.
Headnote:
Benami Transaction - Property Dispute - Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 - Section 4(1), Section 4(2) - The court upheld the lower courts' findings that after the enactment of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, no plea of benami transaction could be set up as a defense. The court also highlighted the provisions of Section 4(1) and Section 4(2) of the Act, emphasizing that no right inherent in a real owner in respect of any property held benami could be enforced and no such plea could be taken in defense to any action by the apparent owner.
Fact of the Case:
The suit was filed by the plaintiff for possession of the suit property based on his title, which was originally owned by his grandfather. The defendants, including the appellant, claimed a benami transaction and raised a defense of limitation.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the plaintiff's predecessor was the purchaser of the suit property and that the defense of benami transaction and limitation were not valid. The court dismissed the appeal and the interim application.
Issues: The issues involved the ownership of the suit property, the applicability of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, and the defense of limitation.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that after the enactment of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, no plea of benami transaction could be set up as a defense. The court also clarified the accrual of cause of action in a suit for possession based on title.
Final Decision: The Second Appeal was dismissed, and the interim application was disposed of. The application for stay was rejected.
JUDGMENT
S C Gupte, J. - Heard learned Counsel for the parties.
2. This Second Appeal challenges concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the courts below on a suit filed by Respondent No.1 herein (original plaintiff) against the Appellant (original defendant No.1) and others. The Plaintiff''s suit was for possession based on his title. It was the Plaintiff''s case that land including the suit property, which was originally owned by Shidappa Mahaling Mahajan, was purchased by the Plaintiff''s grandfather, Rama Bhau Kumathekar (since deceased), for valuable consideration and under a registered sale deed. After sale of a share to one Laxman Bhau Basugade by a registered sale deed, remaining land with deceased Rama, which is the suit property, was renumbered as CST No.1429-A, whilst the share sold to Laxman was allotted CTS No.1429-B. The suit property, being CTS No.1429-A, was in possession of Rama. Rama was in police department and living in another village for his service. One Govind Martanda Basugade, who was the brother-in-law of deceased Rama, who was in need of a house, approached Rama and on his request, the latter put the former in permissive possession of the suit property. Defendant No.1, who is Govind''s son, and others of his family (being defendant nos.2 to 7 to the suit) were accordingly said to be in permissive possession of the suit property after Govind died. It was the plaintiff''s case in the suit that after the death of Rama, the plaintiff, his father (defendant no.8 to the suit, since deceased and deleted from the casue title), who were, respectively, grandson and son of deceased Rama, and who succeeded to the suit property, required the same and approached the defendants, including defendant no.1 (the Appellant herein), for its possession. This was on 15 May 2006. It was submitted by the plaintiff in the plaint, that on this day, the defendants refused to hand over possession of the suit property, stating that the plaintiffs had no connection with it. In the premises, the plaintiff applied for a decree of possession against the defendants based on the former''s title to the suit property.
3. Both courts below have come to a concurrent finding of fact that the predecessor of the plaintiff (deceased Rama) was the purchaser of the suit property vide sale deed dated 17 December 1928. There was no dispute that the plaintiff was the legal heir of deceased Rama and was entitled to succeed to his estate. The only defence raised by the defendants to the suit, including defendant no.1 (the Appellant herein), was that the property was purchased by their predecessor in the name of deceased Rama. In other words, they set up a case of benami transaction claiming title in their predecessor as opposed to the apparent owner (deceased Rama), who was the purchaser named in the sale deed. Both courts below have come to a conclusion that after coming into force of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, no plea of benami transaction could be set up as a defence. The other ground urged by the defendants was of the bar of limitation. It was submitted that the defendants and their predecessor in title were in possession of the suit property ever since Rama purchased the same and that the suit for possession was clearly barred by the law of limitation. Both courts below have come to a conclusion that there was no case of dispossession of the plaintiff more than twelve years prior to the filing of the suit. The lower appellate court observed that the plaintiff''s case was that possession of the suit property was demanded from the defendants on 15 May 2006 (till which date the defendants were in permissive possession under the plaintiff and his predecessor), and the suit was filed immediately after the demand was resisted by the defendants and the suit was thus within time.
4. Neither of the two conclusions concurrently arrived at by the courts below can be faulted in the second appeal. After coming into force of Benami Transac