The main legal point established in the judgment is that the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and its Rules prevail over the corporation's Service Rules, and the court can award compensation for unfair labour practices based on the provisions of the applicable acts and rules.

JUDGMENT

S.C. Gupte, J. - This writ petition (Writ Petition No.13136 of 2019) challenges an order passed by the Industrial Court at Mumbai on a complaint of unfair labour practice filed by the Respondent herein ("complainant"). The complaint was under Items 5, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971.

2. As per the complainant, he was a permanent employee of the Respondent Municipal Corporation ("corporation"). On 9 February 2008, he was arrested by Crime Branch of Mumbai Police and produced before the Metropolitan Magistrate and ultimately released on bail on 4 April 2008, that is to say, after 55 days of arrest. The arrest was in connection with an FIR dated 9 February 2008. The FIR alleged that he had made a demand of Rs.2 lakhs from the victim and threatened with a revolver that the latter''s family would be killed if the demand was not met. According to the complainant, the FIR had falsely implicated him and that he was not present in the crowd when the victim was approached with a demand of Rs.2 lakhs. Be that as it may, considering that the complainant was placed under arrest for more than 48 hours, he was placed under suspension by the corporation vide suspension order dated 28 March 2008. It was his case that there was no nexus between the alleged criminal offence, for which the subject FIR was registered against him, and the nature of duties to be performed by him during the service of the corporation. In the meantime, a departmental enquiry was conducted against the complainant on the basis of a charge sheet of 27 September 2011. (The record does not bear out the circumstances in which this departmental enquiry was conducted against the complainant.) A punishment of fine of Rs.3000/- was imposed on the complainant as a result of this inquiry. This fine was recovered by the corporation. The grievance of the complainant was that even thereafter, the complainant was kept under suspension till the filing of the complaint. (The complaint was filed on 23 September 2015.) The complainant''s grievance before the Industrial Court was that the provisions of Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, which were applicable to the corporation, did not warrant, and accordingly, the latter did not have authority to order, suspension of an employee merely because a criminal offence was registered against him and he was arrested by police for more than 48 hours and that continued suspension of the complainant without any such power or authority amounted to an unfair labour practice under Items 5, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of MRTU and PULP Act, 1971.

3. Before the Industrial Court, several objections were raised by the corporation on maintainability as well as on merits of the complaint. It was, firstly, submitted that the complaint was barred by the law of limitation. The corporation, secondly, relied on its service conditions which inter alia provided for suspension of an employee, if he was under arrest for more than 48 hours, pending decision of a criminal case.

4. On the issue of limitation, the Industrial Court held that the alleged unfair labour practice of suspension of an employee was a recurring cause of action and that the complaint could not be said to be barred by limitation. On the issue of merits of the suspension under the Corporation Service Rules, the court held that the provisions of Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and the Rules framed thereunder, namely, Maharashtra Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, would prevail over the Rules and Regulations prepared by the corporation. The court was of the view that under the Standing Orders Act, there was no question of suspending an employee merely because a criminal offence was registered against him or he was in police custody for any particular period. The court noted that the original suspension was ordered on 28 March 2008; 11 years had since passed during which the corporation was paying the complainant suspension allowa