Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellants : Tejpal Ingale, Vasim Samlewale, Nikhil Pawar.
For the Respondent: K.V. Saste.

Based on the provided legal document, the following key points are relevant:

1. The dispute involves a property transaction where the original owner Krishna entered into an unregistered agreement of sale with the plaintiff prior to the registered sale deed in favor of the defendant No. 1. The agreement of sale was executed on 04.07.1973, and the sale deed in favor of defendant No. 1 was executed on 23.06.1975 (!) (!) .

2. The plaintiff claims to have been in actual possession of the property under the agreement of sale and asserts that the sale deed executed in favor of defendant No. 1 was collusive and executed to defeat his rights (!) (!) .

3. The court examined the timing of the agreement and sale deed, emphasizing that the agreement of sale was prior to the registered sale deed, which affects the determination of notice and the starting point of limitation (!) (!) .

4. The law stipulates that a registered document operates from the time it is registered, but the actual commencement of rights can be deemed from the date of registration or from the date the transaction would have been deemed to have commenced if no registration was required (!) (!) .

5. The court analyzed the concept of notice, particularly actual and constructive notice, noting that actual possession of the plaintiff is deemed notice of his interest in the property (!) (!) (!) .

6. The limitation period for filing a suit to declare a sale deed null and void is three years from the date the right to sue first accrues, which in this case is linked to the date of knowledge of the transaction or the date of the notice calling for possession (!) (!) .

7. The appellate court correctly held that the right to sue accrued on the date of the notice (24.05.1978), when the plaintiff was made aware of the sale deed and faced eviction proceedings, rather than from the date of registration of the sale deed (!) (!) .

8. The defendant No. 1, as a purchaser, was expected to make inquiry about the interest of the plaintiff, who was in actual possession, and failure to do so was considered a neglect that affects the bona fide purchaser status (!) (!) .

9. The courts found that the issuance of a public notice alone does not constitute sufficient inquiry, especially when the defendant was aware of the plaintiff’s possession as a tenant, thus the limitation period was deemed to start from the date of actual knowledge or notice (!) (!) .

10. The courts concluded that the suit was filed within the permissible limitation period, and the findings regarding limitation and the validity of the sale deed were upheld, leading to the dismissal of the second appeal (!) (!) .

In summary, the legal analysis hinges on the timing of the agreement and sale deed, the nature of notice and possession, and the correct application of limitation periods, which collectively support the conclusion that the suit was timely filed and the sale deed's validity was appropriately challenged.